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ABSTRACT

English, Alicia L. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Environmental Tradeoffs
in Bioenergy Production and Agricultural Practices. Major Professor: Wallace E. Tyner.

The focus of this dissertation is the environmental tradeoffs of stover removal
within the Corn Belt. The environmental tradeoffs considered are mainly concerned with
managing soil erosion and soil quality. The analysis layers soil characteristics,
management strategies and per acre costs using an integrated RUSLE2/WEPS model and
an economic optimization model to illuminate a lower bound supply response. Different
assumptions were tested in regards to sustainability, prices, and market integration for
five states and 18,760 soil types throughout the Corn Belt. Sustainability was defined to
limit soil erosion from wind and water to 5 tons/acre/year and the soil organic matter
metric (SCI) to be positive. The results of the modeling exercise show how different costs
for erosion, biomass and conservation management will affect outcomes at the farm level
under different scenarios. This analysis considers how prices for stover and incentives for
management practices through different price regimes could change the outcomes for
different biorefinery locations. The integration of farms into a single market place
additionally considered the tradeoffs of the heterogeneous farmers and transportation
costs in how this market would operate efficiently and regionally.
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CHAPTER 1: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF STOVER REMOVAL IN THE
CORN BELT

1.1.

Introduction

Environmental conservation programs in the United States typically focus on soil erosion
and the protection of wildlife populations. Several methods and programs have been
developed to decrease and limit the amount of soil lost to wind, rill, and water erosion.
From establishing set-aside acreage to changing tillage, practices have decreased erosion
in several areas of the country.

However, as policies consider changing land

management strategies to remove biomass for bioenergy production or alternatively to
meet a demand for low-cost animal feed, there are tradeoffs with environmental services
and long-term environmental effects that need to be considered for the long-term
sustainability of the removal of stover. Under the assumption that biomass feedstock
production will be constrained by land availability, feedstocks alternatively will be
produced from waste products or as part of a value-added supply system. Corn stover, as
part of a value-added system, has the potential to supply the biofeedstock market an
estimated 170 to 256 million dry tons annually, depending on yield and tillage
assumptions (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011). Wilhelm et al. (2007) and Muth,
Bryden and Nelson (In Press) identified soil organic carbon, wind and water erosion,
plant nutrient balances, soil water and temperature dynamics, soil compaction and off-site
environmental impacts as limiting factors to sustainable residue removal.
.
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Harvesting stover has the potential to change land management strategies and has
several environmental and production tradeoffs for the farmer and society that need to be
evaluated regionally and at the field level. Stover residues have increased in volume as a
result of higher plant populations, the usage of fungicides, hybrid seeds and decreases in
residue breakdown from increased conservation tillage practices (Jeschke, 2011). Stover
provides certain ecosystem services when left on the field, which include protection from
erosion, increased soil organic matter, nutrients, improved soil structure and water
holding capacity, though these benefits vary with quantity, climate and management
practices (Andrews, 2006). In addition, the economic and ecosystem value attributed to
stover in the field, depends on soil temperature, erosion rates, increases in organic matter,
increased carbon sequestration, reduced fuel consumption, lower maintenance and labor
costs (Deen and Kataki, 2003, Lal, et al., 1999, Lankoski, et al., 2004, Toliver, 2010).
Several studies have examined the link between soil characteristics and the dynamics of
stover removal on erosion (Johnson, et al., 2006, Mann, et al., 2002, Reicosky, et al.,
1995).
As such, a continuous, reliable and sustainable biomass supply of stover is
dependent on several spatially explicit variables that affect the economic and
environmental sustainability aspects of stover removal throughout the Corn Belt.
Assuming that a market for stover is viable, farmers need to be able to decide whether
they should harvest corn stover, given these tradeoffs. The variety in management and
conservation practices and their effectiveness, translates into greater uncertainty in the
marketplace about the long-term and local effects of removal. Policy has the opportunity
to guide these decisions in order to minimize on- and off-site externalities.

Best

management strategies and potential conflicts with current conservation policies may
result in a farmers being conservative in harvesting, or potentially unwilling to participate
in the market. However, adding the potential profits from stover collection may change
the marginal price to offset conservation practices. These include the potential of
adoption of conservation management strategies like no-till and cover crops. Or without
additional conservation management, a stover market could incentivize removal with
nutrient replacement, as long as erosion rates remain under tolerable levels, fertilizer
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replacement remains economical, and soil quality is not significantly diminished. The
objective of this study is to evaluate the economic and environmental tradeoffs,
specifically those affecting soil resources, through optimizing profit on a per acre basis
from the production of harvesting corn, soybean and stover with the effects of nutrient
applications, erosion and conservation being included in the analysis. The analysis is
considered on a per acre basis without making assumptions about the spillover effects on
neighboring parcels. This section aims to quantify these economic tradeoffs with an
integrated water and soil erosion model based on location specific properties, soil
characteristics and management decisions commonly found throughout Corn Belt.
1.2. Literature Review
Addressing some of the limitations to sustainably harvesting stover starts with current
field management practices, which include tillage and nutrient management. The U.S.
Department of Energy publication, U.S. Billion-ton Update, Biomass Supply for a
Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry (BTSU) assumes that stover residues will be
removed from reduced or no-till land and assumes that none will be removed from land
in conventional tillage1(U.S. Department of Energy, 2011).

Conservation tillage

practices vary throughout the country based on soil type, crop and rotation. Of the 83
million acres in corn production in 2008, 21% was in no-till, 1.4% ridge-till, 17.8% in
mulch-till, and 24.3% in reduced tillage (Conservation Technology Information Center,
2008). Different tillage techniques will vary the amount of residues available for harvest.
Adoption of tillage practices vary based on several producer and farm characteristics, in
addition to local, state and national agency requirements (Bultena and Hoiberg, 1983).
Farmers may not adopt conservation practices due to a divergence in perceptions of
economic costs and environmental benefits.

1

Conventional tillage is a practice in which producers use a disc or plow to incorporate residues into the
soil post-harvest, leaving less than 15% residue. Conservation tillage includes, no-till (> 30% cover),
ridge-till and mulch-till (15-30% cover).
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The farmer’s economic decision weighs the direct costs of undertaking
conservation measures and replacement costs through increased inputs and increased
equipment costs with the opportunity costs of forgone future productivity through soil
losses (Barbier, 1998, Javurek, et al., 2007, Larson, et al., 2001). Failing to recognize the
link between environmental factors and incentivizing stover harvest may create
unintended consequences in conservation planning of natural resources. Consider for a
moment that farmers have numerous tradeoffs that occur in the corn grain and stover
harvesting decision. In order to maintain short-term productivity of the land, a farmer
will manage soil health and the amount of erosion through management techniques and
nutrient replacement. Although there are several other tradeoffs that the farmer makes,
these two non-market goods are influenced by the relative prices of conservation
practices, stover returned to the field, irrigation (if applicable) and nutrients. Farmers
regardless of conservation practices will still be producing some erosion and some level
of soil health at a cost. These costs are estimated based on the alternative marketable
goods, as environmental goods do not often have a market price.
The marginal private benefits and costs may not induce conservation tillage
adoption. Therefore, the USDA National Resource Conservation Service suggests 30% of
the field to be covered in the spring to prevent soil erosion with the additional tolerance
level (T-Factor) that soil erosion is estimated to be no more than 3 to 5 tons of
soil/acre/year2(Gallagher, et al., 2003). The productivity losses of erosion, except in the
extreme cases, can take several decades to realize through decreased yields.
Additionally, due to improved seed varieties, irrigation and weather, yields can remain
constant or improve even when considering soil losses. Some of the effects of erosion
may be mitigated through alternative management strategies like using cover crops, green
manure and precision agriculture (Tyndall, et al., 2011). Though it is estimated that

2

In order to maintain lands with soil erosion under the tolerable limits, producers are eligible for certain
government programs and assistance under EQUIP, CRP, WEP. Soils that are classified as highly erodible
have different stricter requirements in regards to conservation practices and acceptable erosion rates.
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erosion between 2 and 5 tons/acre/year or 0.4-1 mm/year can balance soil production and
losses, in low sloping areas (Montgomery, 2007). Erosion over 40 tons/acre/year3 is
considered extreme, 7 tons/acre/year is average for croplands in the United States, and for
undisturbed forests erosion rates average about 0.02 tons/acre/year (Pimentel, et al.,
1995). The effects of tillage on yields varies throughout the Corn Belt, and the benefits
of conservation may not be immediately seen by the farmer as a proportion of the
benefits can be attributed to future soil health and production and decreases to off-site
costs (Barbier, 1998, Toliver, 2010). In addition, the amount and the effect of residue left
on the field depends on several factors (e.g. slope, soil characteristics, tillage, drainage,
soil organic matter and carbon (SOM/SOC)) which need to be considered, although the
interactions among these components are quite complex (Coulter and Nafziger, 2008).
Previous work has also considered the stock of soil organic matter, fertilizer amounts and
depth of topsoil, as important factors in crop rotation decisions given that the rotations
are economically viable (Burt, 1981).
Nutrient replacement is a significant concern for stover harvest activities.
Previous studies by Fernandez and Sawyer (2007), have found that the NPK content of
harvested stover also varies throughout the Corn Belt. The effectiveness of nutrient
replacement depends on mobilization, concentrations, application rates and erosion.
Harvesting stover has implications for nutrient removal and cycling beyond nitrogen,
phosphorous and potassium, to decreasing micronutrients like calcium, magnesium and
sulfur. Alternatively, stover remaining in the field can affect the absorption rates of
nutrient application. Each of these effects can impact long-term yields(Sawyer and
Mallarino, 2007). Brechbill, Tyner and Ileleji (2008) calculate that nutrient replacement
costs for NPK content of the stover is approximately $17.23 per metric ton of stover
removed, but do not consider the costs of replacing other micronutrients that stover
returns to the soil. Thompson and Tyner (2011) estimate that the cost of replacing
micronutrients is estimated to be $2.00 Mg-1 and that total nutrient replacement costs are

3

This translates into less than an acre-inch.
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approximately 24.17 Mg-1, which accounted for over half the harvest costs. Estimates
vary based on fertilizer costs, which change spatially and temporally, and with crop
rotation (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011).
Several additional factors affect the amount of stover available for removal.
Rainfall and temperature during different phases of the growth cycle and harvest, along
with fertilizer application, are the main driving factors in corn yields, as well as the
resulting quantities of biomass (Cantero-Martinez, et al., 2006, Mann, et al., 2002).
Stover residues have increased in volume as a result of higher plant populations and
yield, the usage of fungicides and hybrid seeds, and decreases in residue breakdown from
tillage practices (Jeschke, 2011).

In addition, the economic and ecosystem value

attributed to stover in the field depends on soil temperature, erosion rates, increases in
organic matter, increased carbon sequestration, reduced fuel consumption, lower
maintenance and labor costs (Deen and Kataki, 2003, Lal, et al., 1999, Lankoski, et al.,
2004, Toliver, 2010). Harvesting stover impacts nutrient removal and cycling, beyond
nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium to micronutrients like calcium, magnesium and
sulfur, while leaving it in the field can affect the absorption rates of nutrient application,
both can impact long-term yields (Sawyer and Mallarino, 2007).
Several studies have looked at the linkage between soil characteristics and the
dynamics of stover removal on erosion (Johnson, et al., 2006, Mann, et al., 2002,
Reicosky, et al., 1995).

Although there are many factors that affect the soil

characteristics in a field or region, the presence of SOC in agricultural soils has been
shown to be an important but, imperfect signal on soil health and yields through direct
and indirect feedback effects (Reeves, 1997). Of the soil organic matter from residues
that is returned to the soil, roughly 58% of it is converted into SOC. Accumulation of
SOC depends on the rate at which biomass is added to the soil minus the rate at which
erosion and biological oxidation are decreasing the SOC stocks.

In general, soil

cultivation decreases the amount of soil organic carbon available, by increasing the rates
of oxidation and erosion. Although a majority of the SOM comes from plant roots, the
effects of stover removal without offsetting practices can degrade soils over time, through
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wind and water erosion. In addition to surface crop residue, rotation and cover crops
along with conservation covers, increase the amount of biomass available for this
biological process (Follett, 2001). Accounting for soil organic matter losses, a greater
percentage of stover may be required to remain on the ground, given that carbon turnover
in the soil may be a slower process than the potential effects of erosion on yields
(Johnson, et al., 2006, Johnson, et al., 2006, Wilhelm, et al., 2007).
The environmental and management limitations of stover harvest are weighed
with the economic decisions. Private costs to the farmer may include increased nutrient
and management costs, and public costs to society may be incurred through increased
nutrient runoff, erosion, decreases in soil organic carbon, and micronutrient losses that
affect the long-term productivity of the land. These costs and concerns were identified as
potential information barriers to market participation for farmers choosing to harvest and
market corn stover (Sawyer and Mallarino, 2007, Tyndall, et al., 2011).

The

environmental and economic factors vary throughout the Corn Belt, suggesting different
marginal costs of stover and regional limitations to harvesting. These heterogeneous and
temporal costs affect supply density, which in turn determines plant locations,
profitability, and environmental implications of removal. When considering the removal
of corn stover from agricultural fields in the Midwest, the benefits and costs associated
with changes in management are considered for the farmers.

The biofuels market

opportunities for stover harvesting and marketing must weigh the additional profits of
stover with the increased nutrient management costs, environmental opportunity costs
and the potential changes to yields.
As farmers will need to choose the optimal amount of stover harvested while
minimizing the effects of removal on soil erosion and the health of the soil, the problem
can be formulated into an optimization problem to identify key tradeoffs between these
decisions. McConnell(1983) used optimal control theory to identify the key tradeoffs in
conservation management in soil conservation, concluding that farmers will erode the soil
up until the point at which the marginal costs of erosion is equal to the marginal revenue
adopting conservation practices. Though, one major assumption in this work was that the
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private and social objectives were identical. Barbier (1988) updates the McConnell
model by adding in the temporal effects of erosion, noting that as the discount factor
increases it creates incentives for erosion, as the effects of erosion may take longer to
realize. Two major conclusions that this work emphasizes are that a change in output and
input prices may have contradictory effects on soil erosion. Primarily, as price increases
result in short-term gains and lead to intensification in production, this often these shortterm gains can negatively impact soil resources. However, as profitability increases over
time, there may be additional incentives to conserve soil, as soil quality leads to better
yields with fewer inputs. These timing issues are highlighted in the dynamics of the corn
stover market, as without environmental constraint the additional revenues may
disproportionately affect future soil conservation. Additionally, when considering the
dynamic optimization of the problem, limitations on the stock variables related to the
depth of topsoil and current availability of soil organic matter will alter where the
conditions are binding (Burt, 1981). The short term effects of removal can be offset by
additional applications of nutrients or improved varieties of seeds, while the long-term
effects will be mitigated through management practices, crop rotation, and limiting
harvest activities on environmentally sensitive soils. Key metrics of soil productivity will
also be measured through the levels of soil organic matter and soil erosion.
1.3. Methods
1.4. Integrated Environmental Model and Scenarios
Through management practices of the farm, a farmer can choose strategies that benefit
both the environment and their per acre profit margins through the removal of stover and
application of conservation practices. Accounting for the spatial heterogeneity of soil
dynamics and erosion is accomplished using an integrated model which combines the
Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE2) and the Wind Erosion Equation
(WEPS). These models are coupled with databases that contain relevant climate, soils,
management weights, yields and location specific properties. This integrated model was
chosen to illuminate the environmental effects from changes in soil erosion and soil
organic matter. Although these models are not novel, the combined effects of stover
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removal, soil erosion from wind and water and soil organic matter are often separated
analytically. This shortcoming neglects that the magnitude of change in some areas may
result in larger effects to the soil quality.
The integrated RUSLE2 and WEPS model was developed as an assessment tool
for residue availability throughout the United States4. Most recently the model was used
to assess the sustainability of stover removal in Iowa (Muth and Bryden, 2012). The
RUSLE2 model simulates field conditions at the farm level based on soil, climate, field
management, cropping, and residue effects to estimate the effects of daily weather
patterns on water based erosion. RUSLE2 is mainly used in conservation planning and
controlling for the effects of rill and interrill types of erosion on land usage from crop,
pasture, range and forest lands (Foster, 2005). The WEPS model uses several of the same
field level conditions to simulate the effects of wind on soil erosion by direction and
magnitude. WEPS is comprised of several submodels (weather, hydrological, residue,
soils). These models simulate the likely erosion response to a variety of environmental
and management factors, and as such these models enumerate the potential outcomes of
farm-level decisions. The combinations of these two erosion models are useful in order
to calculate the sustainability of total erosion from both wind and water through the Soil
Conditioning Index (SCI).
These models calculate the long-term average effects of wind and water erosion.
Typically these models have been used in parallel to conservation planning activities.
However, there are limitations when considering these effects in a dynamic market
system, such as the production of corn, soybeans, and stover, as switching field practices
would affect these averages. Other field-level conditions, like changes in precipitation,
temperatures or yields would also have consequences on these averages.

David Muth and his colleagues at Idaho National Lab built the integrated model and provided the data and
simulations for this paper.
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The management options used for this economic analysis can be found in Table
1-1, and an example and description of one of the scenarios can be found in Table 1-2.
Table 1-2 describes the technical aspects management scheme and the timing of
operations throughout the growing year for the RUSLE2/WEPS model. Changes in
supply density and environmental outcomes can separately or simultaneously be affected
by these different management regimes.

The discrete management choices in the

integrated model result in non-continuous output in stover. For example, a soil type may
be harvesting at the highest rate of removal, but additional gains in harvestable amounts
may only come from adding a cover crop or decreasing tillage. As supply sheds are
delineated, the distributions of these outcomes over space and time (in terms of crop
rotation and contract length) are going to be critical.
Table 1-1: Regimes for the Integrated RUSLE2/WEPS Model
Crop
Rotation
Cover Crop
Regime

CG
SB
NCC
100rye
40rye, 60clover
60rye, 40radish

Tillage
Regime
Residue
Removal
Regime
Barrier
Regime

RT
NT
NRH
MRH
MHH
HRH
NVB
SVB

Corn grain
Soybeans
No cover crop
100% Rye winter cover
40% Rye winter cover, 60% Clover winter cover
60% Rye winter cover, 40% Oilseed Radish winter
cover
Reduced Tillage: Chisel Plow, Disk tandem light
finishing
No Tillage: Minimum possible disturbance
No Residue Harvest
Moderate Residue Harvest: Approximately 35%
Moderately High Residue Harvest: Approximately 50%
High Residue Harvest: Approximately 80%
No vegetative barrier
Strip vegetative barrier: modeled as cool season grass
3m wide in middle of slope

Note: For each crop management zone and soil type, each permutation of the above regime was used in the
model.
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Table 1-2: Example of the Regime Combination for the Integrated Model
Name
CMZ01-CG,SBNT-NRH-NCCNVB
CMZ01-CG,SBNT-NRH-NCCNVB
CMZ01-CG,SBNT-NRH-NCCNVB
CMZ01-CG,SBNT-NRH-NCCNVB

Date of
operation
5/10/1

9/17/1

5/25/2

9/12/2

Description of
operation
Planter, double disk
open row with fluted
coulter
Harvest, killing crop
50pct standing stubble

Crop

Drill or airseeder,
double disk, w/ fluted
coulters
Harvest, killing crop
20pct standing stubble

Soybean, group 0
and I, 7inch rows

Corn, grain

Note: The naming convention for this example is crop management zone 1 (CMZ01), corn-soybean
rotation (CG, SB), no-till (NT), no stover harvested (NRH), no cover crop (NCC), no vegetative barrier
(NVB).

These scenarios represent the most likely cropping and management decisions for
the Corn Belt. Given the diversity in landscape of the region, the results from the
integrated model were related back to geographic locations based on SURGO soil type,
slope, 2008-2010 cropping rotations, and tillage practice5. Yields for corn grain were
based on POLYSIS estimates at the county level. These were not included in the original
dataset, and therefore are backed out from the total biomass harvested in the first year,
based on the percentages of removal and then divided by 56 to convert the amounts into
bushels per acre. Yield drag estimates were then subtracted from these estimates. The
scenarios were undertaken based on soil type, under the assumption that farmers will
choose management practices to the dominant soil conditions of their farm for a threeyear period. These choices are limited by their respective effects on the t-factor, or
overall erosion calculated within the model. Erosion rates above the prescribed t-factor

5

The data for these layers can be found the NRCS Soil data mart (SURGO,
http://soildatamart.nrcs.usda.gov/), Geospatial gateway (Elevation and Cropland Data Layer
http://datagateway.nrcs.usda.gov/) and the Indiana Department of Agriculture (tillage practices,
http://www.in.gov/isda/files/2011_Poster.pdf).
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occur when adding the removal of stover beyond these management practices. Based on
the data from RUSLE2/WEPS we assigned rotations, in order to not allow the
optimization model to switch rotations mid-period, the values were discounted to the
present. In fixing the rotations, we limit the number of assumptions about future farm
decisions that may be based on a multitude of factors, beyond the scope of this study.
However, this also limits the analysis to the potential lower bound of the supply response,
given the current rotation decisions.
The integrated modeling framework outputs four variables critical in the
economic optimization framework.

Important variables from this model are those

relating to wind (windEros) and water erosion (waterEros), the Soil Conditioning Index
(SCI) and the total biomass removed by year (totBioRem(yr)). The SCI is used to predict
whether the management practices result in maintained or increased levels of soil organic
matter. The SCI combines the effects of organic matter returned to the soil (SCI_OM);
field operations (SCI_FO) such as tillage, fertilizer application, harvesting etc.; and the
erosion factor (SCI_ER). The values of the SCI signal the trend in organic matter given
these factors. It does not predict the amount or the rate of change of organic matter. It
should be interpreted within the context of the soil class. As such, poor soils with a SCI
near zero are maintained as poor soils (Soil Quality Institute, 2003). Wind (windEros)
and water erosion (waterEros) variables dictate both on-site and off-site costs of the
production decisions.

On-site costs can be offset using conservation management

techniques (e.g. cover crops, barrier strips and tillage), increased nutrient replacement
and potentially decreases in yields over time. Off-site costs have to do with sediment
delivery into watersheds or the transfer of soil resources to other locations within or
external to the farm. Ultimately, the driving economic factor will be quantity of stover
harvested, or total biomass (totBioRem(yr)), indicating the producer’s decision to
participate in the biomass market.
We surmise that the farmer can choose the crop rotation, cover crop regime,
tillage regime, residual removal regime, yield regime and vegetative barrier regime
(Table 1-1). The combinations of these six decisions enumerate 576 different options for
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each of the five states and their respective soil types included in this analysis, Iowa
(4493), Illinois (4485), Indiana (2941), Minnesota (3861) and Nebraska (2980). This
results in over 14.4 million different combinations from the integrated erosion models.
These results were then used in the following economic framework and related back to
geographic locations in order to illustrate the potential agronomic and economic tradeoffs
that may occur within a biofuels supply shed.
1.5. Economic Framework
The heterogeneous nature of farms in the agricultural landscape for Corn Belt has been
used to incorporate the differences in cropping patterns, soil characteristics and yields
from an economic and environmental standpoint. The farmer’s decision-making can then
be viewed through a dynamic optimization framework, in which the farmer will choose to
maximize profits from the production of corn, soybeans and stover subject to the
production of these crops and their relative variable and environmental costs or
regulatory constraint. The general formulation of this objective is,
[

∫

(

)

]

(1)

Subject to an equation of motion,
̇

( )

(2)
(3)

where δ is the farmer (i) discount rate, p is the price of the output, y is a function of
output for each cropping rotation i, (continuous corn, corn-soybean, corn-corn-bean),
based on s(t) soil loss, x(t) soil quality, and z(t) a vector of inputs (e.g. replacement costs
for fertilizer). The value of z in any period depends on activities in the previous period
with regards to crop, stover removal and erosion. This model has been widely used for
looking at the effects of soil losses on productivity from an economic standpoint (Barbier,
1998, Barbier, 1988, McConnell, 1983) and is useful for looking at the effects of current
decisions on future outcomes. Although the model has been used to incorporate erosion
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into economic and conservation decision making, our model estimates the optimization
problem to have costs and revenues adjusted to the rotation decision with profits adjusted
to a single year. The optimization is as follows,
[

]

(4)
(5)

{

}
(6)

{

}
{

}

(

(7)

)

where
is measured as ($/acre).
is the discount factor
i is the crop choice [corn, soybeans, stover]
pi is a vector of output prices ($) based on 2012 Purdue Crop Budgets and stover prices
are based on Thompson and Tyner (2011)
YSB are soybean yields were used from the SURGO databases, which gives the
average yield for soils in the county
r is a vector of input prices ($) based 2012 Purdue Crop Budgets
z are replacement nutrients [fertilizer(N,P,K)] and variable and fixed costs related to the
production and harvest, nutrient replacement equations explicitly are in Equations
13 to 15.
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Table 1-3: Managements by Rotation and Tillage for RUSLE2/WEPS
Rotation
Rotational Corn

Rotational Soybeans

Continuous Corn

Tillage Management
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter
NT
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter
RT
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble
Drill or airseeder, double disk, w/ fluted coulters
NT
Harvest, killing crop 20pct standing stubble
Drill or airseeder, double disk, w/ fluted coulters
Harvest, killing crop 20pct standing stubble
RT
Chisel,st.pt.
Disk, tandem light finishing
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter
NT
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble
Planter, double disk opener w/fluted coulter
RT
Harvest, killing crop 50pct standing stubble

These managements designated by the integrated model can be found in Table
1-3. Corresponding per acre prices and costs can be found in Table 1-4. Practices
relating to the harvest and removal of stover were included in the harvest cost estimate,
and practices relating to the cover crops were included in the cover crop prices. Farms
may choose to use these calculations as part of their overall farm management strategy,
as it is likely that a farm will have a couple of different cropping systems and soil
conditions throughout their operations.
As the effects of erosion can be difficult to quantify in terms of yield reductions,
except in extreme events, these losses can take years to be apparent6.

Losses in

productivity resulting from erosion are twofold; losses can be in quantity, through the
physical loss of topsoil, and in quality, through the degradation and depletion of nutrients.

6

It is important to note that here are several additional factors that go into assessing the effects of erosion on
productivity, and several models (EPIC, APEX) have been built to asses these additional site-specific
characteristics.
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Table 1-4: Cost Estimates For the Model
Item
Corn7
Soybeans
Stover8
Cover crops
100% Rye
40/60 Rye-Clover mix
60/40 Rye-Radish
Nutrients
Nitrogen
Phosphorus
Potassium
Vegetative barrier
Stover Harvest (includes net wrap, Fuel and labor)
Machinery Costs by Rotation and tillage9
No-till
Continuous corn (CG)
Corn in Rotation
Soybeans in Rotation
Reduced Tillage
Continuous corn (CG)
Corn in Rotation
Soybeans in Rotation
Misc. Costs (seed, pesticides, hauling, drying, etc.)10
Continuous Corn yields less than 122 Bu/ac
Continuous Corn yields greater than 184 Bu/ac
Continuous Corn yields between 122 and 184 bu/ac
Corn in Rotation, yields less than 130 Bu/ac
Corn in Rotation, yields greater than 193 Bu/ac
Corn in Rotation, yields between 130 and 193 Bu/ac
Soybeans in Rotation

7

unit
$/ Bushel
$/ Bushel
$/ ton

Value
$ 7.00
$ 12.00
$ 80.00

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$

$/ lb.
$/ lb.
$/ lb.
$/acre
$/ton

$
0.54
$
0.74
$
0.57
$ 100.00
$ 34.03

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$

78.80
65.06
65.35

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$

78.80
68.41
74.67

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

256.00
294.00
289.00
252.00
285.00
282.00
150.00

31.69
36.61
30.41

These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A. Miller, B. Nielsen, T. J. Vyn, S. Casteel, B. Johnson, K.Wise,
and B. Erickson. (2012) 2012 Purdue Crop Cost & Return Guide, Purdue Extension..
8
These costs are based on Thompson, J.L., and W.E. Tyner. "Corn Stover for Bioenergy Production: Cost
Estimates and Farmer Supply Response.", ibid. Adjusted to a $45.97 farmgate, after adjusting for fixed
harvest and storage costs originally included the paper.
9
These costs are based on Duffy, M. (2012) Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa - 2012. Iowa State
University Extension.
10
These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A. Miller, B. Nielsen, T. J. Vyn, S. Casteel, B. Johnson,
K.Wise, and B.Erickson. Purdue Crop Cost & Return Guide. Purdue Extension. ID-166-W.(2012)
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For this analysis, quantity lost is measured through total erosion, accounting for wind and
water erosion, and qualitatively through the Soil Conditioning Index. Accounting for
these decreases can be offset to varying degrees through other inputs and technologies
that will affect yield (Burt, 1981). However, the complex nature of soil dynamics and
ongoing debate in the literature of the extent of erosion on yields, accounting for
productivity losses is accomplished through the nutrient replacement approach and
constraints on soil organic matter and erosion. This allows for a simplification in the
amount, type, and returns to inputs needed to maintain yields. Physical losses, through
degradation of soil carbon are also important, though more information is needed on-site
to determine how farmers quantitatively will account for diminished carbon in terms of
productivity and management decisions. These decisions will be likely based on current
soil conditions in terms of depth of top soil, erosion potential and available nutrients
already within the soil. In addition, the relative price dynamics between the relative
prices of stover, the prices of nutrients and the maintenance costs to conservation
practices can alter the long-term dynamics of the decision making framework.
Accounting for the long-term dynamics of this problem is complicated, as year to
year changes may alter the path of long-term erosion. To simplify the dynamic nature of
the problem the following assumptions are made. Pimentel (1995), estimates that the
effects of 17 tons/hectare/year, assuming a soil depth of 15 cm, a 5% slope on loamy soil
containing 4% organic matter, in conventional tillage, in the United States, would result
in 8% lower corn yields in the next year, without offsetting the losses in nutrients, water
and other inputs. Bishop and Allen (1989), estimate that the relationship between yields
and erosion is
(8)
(

)

(9)

18
where

is the incremental loss of soil and

In our model,

is a constant that varies by crop and slope11.

is a result of the integrated RUSLE/WEPS model and is the net wind

and water erosion determined by slope, rotation, crop, cover crop (CC), tillage (till),
residue removal (HR), and vegetative barrier (VBR) choices. Since we want to isolate
the contribution of controlling for erosion in the current period, the equation of motion
needs to assume that the yield trend is zero. This allows for a simplification in the
amount, type, and returns to inputs needed to maintain yields. In order for the equation
of motion to be in a steady-state, the following constraint must also be true,
(10)
(

)

(11)
(12)

where

or

must be zero. Offsetting erosion

is captured through the changes in

nutrient, management choices and soil conditioning indices.

Therefore, the driving

assumption is that even in the presence of erosion, offsetting the negative yield effects in
terms of quality can be accomplished through nutrient replacement and maintaining a
positive SCI. This does not hold true, if the logarithmic change in yields is not zero from
year to year. Additionally, the stock of soil resources in a location will have change the
impact of erosion, as losses will disproportionately affect soils that are already limited.
As such, larger volumes of erosion would have disproportionate effects on yields,
through both the quality and quantity effects of soil losses. Additional stock variables
could be considered in future research pertaining to the quantities and quality of the soil
resources available. Unfortunately, at this time a wide scale analysis of soil organic
matter throughout the Corn Belt has not been done.

11

Though since Bishop and Allen (Bishop, J., J. Allen, and W.B.E. Dept. 1989. The on-site costs of soil
erosion in Mali: World Bank, Policy Planning and Research Staff, Environment Department.), was
published the magnitude of erosion losses is also considered to be affected by soil type, climate, land
preparation, management etc. (Enters, T. 1998. Methods for the economic assessment of the on-and off-site
impacts of soil erosion: IBSRAM. )
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In our simulations, the integrated modeling framework assesses erosion and
biomass yields based on deterministic yields that are entered by the user.

The

complicated feedback effects of soil erosion on yields are still widely debated throughout
the agronomic literature. The threshold where quality and quantity effects of wind and
water erosion will dampen yields is still unknown. However, scenarios were undertaken
assuming a drag on yields, without explicitly identifying what would cause such declines,
but are useful in illustrating how the decision making process may change in the presence
of yield reductions.
This result simplifies the effect of erosion through time. To maintain yield levels,
nutrient replacement values were based on the average annual quantities lost per ton of
erosion found in Pimentel (1995) and from estimates used in calculating EQUIP
payments (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2010).

For inputs needed to

maintain yields in period t, the following constraints (Equations 13-15) were added for
fertilizer usage. The equation is based on the Tri-state Fertilizer Recommendations For
Corn, Soybeans, Wheat and Alfalfa (Vitosh, et al., 1995) for nitrogen, phosphorus and
potassium and with recommendations for stover nutrient replacement (Brechbill and
Tyner, 2008) and erosion losses (Pimentel, et al., 1995). The units for z are pounds per
acre.
(

{

)

}
13)

(
(

)
)

(14)
15)

NCredit is the nitrogen credit given by the previous crop. Soybean credit is 30 lbs./acre.
CR is the portion of nutrients removed per pound and by bushel (for corn, 0.37 of P and
0.27 of K, for Soybeans 0.8 of P and 1.4 of K). These are averages; individual farms and
soils will have specific recommendations based on levels already present in the soil. The
other inputs within the vector z, (tillage, vegetative buffer strip and cover crop), decrease
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the overall amount of erosion,

. The effects of these practices on erosion are calculated

within the integrated model, though it is important to include the costs of adopting these
practices within our optimization model. Therefore, z(other) will equal 1 if the practice is
in place.
The SCI metric to measure whether or not these practices improve or degrade soil
organic carbon was calculated. Though as the metric is descriptive and not quantitative,
it was not given a cost, nor is its outcome constrained, except in the case of imposing
sustainability criteria through external sources.

The metric describes how the

management practice regime will affect the quality of the soil already there - meaning if
the soil class is a 3, management and harvesting of stover could degrade soil resources
(negative SCI)or improve soil resources (positive SCI). The metric does not indicate at
what level the SCI would need to be in order to improve the value or productivity of the
land. Benefits for soil organic carbon levels are highly dependent on the type of cover
crop chosen, what root structure looks like, timing etc.

Additionally, other effects

(compounded with fertilizer applications, weather, etc.) may affect fertility. Therefore,
this metric is reported but not explicitly a factor in the decision making process.
There are several key aspects to focus on when considering this potential market.
Different management regimes will affect the profitability, density and supply area, as
well as, the environmental outcomes (both erosion and SCI) on a per acre basis. Chapter
1 focuses on these outcomes at the soil/farm level given different incentives and
constraints, and Chapter 2 focuses on the wider marketplace and regulations that may
produce these outcomes. In terms of the integrated modeling framework, environmental
outcomes will be affected by crop rotation, the quantities of biomass harvested and the
usage of conservation practices (tillage, cover crops and barrier strips).

Biomass

outcomes will also be affected by crop rotation and conservation practices. The scenarios
were chosen to illustrate the tradeoffs between the environmental and economic
incentives. The analysis for this paper illustrates the optimal decision making process
under various scenarios and sensitivities. The description of the scenarios is in Table 1-5.
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Table 1-5: Sensitivity Scenarios
Scenarios
Optimal

Description
High crop prices ($7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $80/ton stover); Erosion
Nutrient replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre)

NoCoverNoErosion
High crop prices; No Cover Crops; No Erosion Nutrient Replacement
RR
$7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $90.97/ton stover; Erosion Nutrient
HighStoverP
replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre)
$7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $34.03/ton stover; Erosion Nutrient
LowStoverP
replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre)
High crop prices; No erosion replacement (NPK kg/ha); Erosion is limited to
TValueErosion
5 tons/acre/year
High crop prices; Erosion Nutrient Replacement rates of (2.32-1-0) (NPK
NoConservation
lbs/acre); Forced Reduced Tillage, No Cover Crop and No Vegetative
_LowErosionCost
Barrier
High crop prices ($7/bu corn, $12/bu soybeans, $80/ton stover); Erosion
NoConservation
Nutrient replacement rates of (16.01- 0.064-131.329), (NPK lbs/acre);
_HighErosionCost
Forced Reduced Tillage, No Cover Crop and No Vegetative Barrier

1.6. Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for state level profit, erosion, biomass harvested and NPK
nutrient replacement rates can be found in Table 1-6 to Table 1-10, and the distribution of
these outcomes spatially can be found in the respective figures through the section. The
state by state results for these scenarios (Table 1-5) are not constrained by land currently
in agricultural production or crop rotation and represent the potential outcomes for this
market. In Section 1.5.6.1, land availability and intensive and extensive land use will be
considered, along with sustainability limitations based on crop rotation in section1.6.7.
One important caveat when looking at the profit calculated in the model is that it does not
include overhead costs for grain and soybeans or additional storage or transportation
costs that the farmer could potentially have to account for when making on farm
decisions related to the harvesting of stover.
Although there are differences at the state-level there are several conclusions that
are consistent by scenario. The scenario Socially Optimal, which equates private and
social discount rates, captures the effects of high prices for corn, soybeans and $80/ton
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stover prices. Farmers internalize the costs of erosion in their decision making process at
the high replacement rate. Stover prices were chosen through other studies that estimate
that farmers will be incentivized to add additional acres to corn production to boost stover
production (Thompson and Tyner, 2011). This assumes a uniform price for biomass,
regardless of distance to end demand markets and regional concentrations of supplies.
Although there are many differences between states, counties and soil types, the model is
constructed such that the market for stover is assumed to be the same across the entire
sample area. We constructed the Socially Optimal scenario, such that it will have similar
effects in terms of management choices throughout the sample region and give a baseline
comparison across state and county lines. The expected differences are to be in the
areas/soil types that choose to participate in the market and the rates of harvest. Figure
1-1 and Figure 1-2 indicate the optimal erosion rates and biomass available for harvest in
each soil type.
Across all states, the optimal management choice for a majority of soil types
under the Socially Optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium high
residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no vegetative barrier. This management
strategy is an expected result of the model given that profitability increases based on the
ability to market stover continuously and that there is a cost to erosion. As such, the
outcomes for optimal rotation management in this section for all states, for all scenarios
are continuous corn. Additionally, the integrated models have on average, higher rates of
erosion for corn-soybean rotations and when erosion has a higher perceived cost, as in the
Socially Optimal case. Farmers will choose a continuous corn rotation coupled with
100% rye to minimize erosion effects and maximize benefits. As we see in section 1.6.7,
when analyzing the optimal cover crop choices for corn-soybean and corn-corn-soybean
rotations, the optimal choice of cover crop usage is no longer 100% rye. The socially
optimal scenario is intended to give an environmentally conservative baseline for soil
types and regions participating in the market. Assuming that farmers will internalize
costs for soil erosion, such that changing economic incentives will increase (decrease)
area participating or the amounts harvested simultaneously picking the optimal
management decisions that result in the greatest profit. The results of decreasing the
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importance of erosion costs can be seen in the outcomes of the NoCoverNoErosionRR
and NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenarios. These scenarios reflect the potential
for erosion and soil quality outcomes where these costs are not accounted for internally or
if there are no incentives for conservation management.
The use of cover crops can increase the density of supply and therefore may be
more efficient when looking at localized supply shed incentives. Although the costs of
cover crops are assumed to cover all of the costs of planting and killing the cover,
depending on where in the state the farm is located and the soil type from which stover is
harvested, farmers may gain an economic advantage in their usage. When considering
the incentives needed to spur the adoption of cover crops or to minimize erosion, the
farmer’s internal price for erosion may drive these decisions, without any additional
incentives needed (from the stover market or thorough subsidization). Though there are
several benefits to cover crops, only 11 to 18 percent of farmers currently use them in
practice (Singer, et al., 2007). This could be attributed to underestimated costs of using
cover crops, especially in regards to the timing of seeding and killing of the cover. Slight
differences in erosion also may not be visible to farmers and there may be preferences in
which crop to use as a cover for several reasons. If farmers do not see the economic or
social costs of erosion on-site, or they perceive the costs of cover crops to be high, then
farmers are not likely to adopt cover crops. Additionally, the benefits of erosion control
vary depending on the location, soil type and other numerous factors that change through
the landscape. These benefits may also diminish as the farmer reaches certain thresholds
of erosion control, and then the question becomes, does the additional ton of soil loss
saved through adopting a practice really make a difference for farmer decision making.
One of the extensions to this work in the future is to examine the amount of erosion,
which would spur the adoption of cover crops.

However, if profit factors over

stewardship, then farmers will choose cover crops only when it results in additional
economic benefits. Cover crops can provide not only the benefits of decreasing erosion,
but allow for higher quantities of biomass available for removal.
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Neglecting internalized costs but following regulatory suggestion of no more than
5 tons/acre/year, the outcomes of the TvalueErosion scenario result in both erosion and
harvest rates increasing in several areas over the Socially Optimal scenario. This implies
that internalized costs may decrease farmer participation in the market, if farmers
perceive these costs to be higher than the costs imposed by non-binding regulation.
Although it may be difficult to gauge farmer perceptions of environmental costs, other
factors such as land value may proxy for these internal costs of erosion, and land rental
contracts can prevent farmers from mining the soil resources.

Rising land values,

potential volatility in crop prices and in inputs, like fertilizer and improved seed varieties,
which offset the effects of some erosion, will affect these non-market values and
perceptions of erosion. If this is the case, then soil quality and long-term sustainability
may be more important in the farmer’s decision making regardless of financial or
regulatory obligation, reflecting higher internal costs. Absent regulation or contracts,
farmers with higher erosion costs would be already practicing cover crops, using barrier
strips and conservation tillage.
In our scenarios, farms where the internal costs are not satisfied at the $80/ton
stover price would be represented by soil types and regions that practice conservation but
choose not to harvest. However, as farmers have different perceived costs and attitudes
towards conservation, these true costs may not be known or measurable. Therefore,
looking at compliance with regulations or in the absence of these costs is useful in
analyzing the potential outcomes of policies on a variety of different types of farmers. It
should be noted that the current policy, USDA’s 5/tons/acre/year is not a strictly binding
constraint, given issues with compliance and the variability in enforcement. The scenario
NoConservation_LowErosionCost (in which farmers do not practice any conservation),
represent the potential downsides of incentivizing harvesting biomass when farmers see
little to no costs to erosion or value to conservation practices. These two extremes, with
high internal costs and no internal costs, represent the potential upper and lower bounds
for the biomass-erosion tradeoffs (Figure 1-1 to Figure 1-4).
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Figure 1-1: Optimal Scenario Erosion Results
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Figure 1-2: Optimal Scenario Biomass Harvested Results
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Figure 1-3: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Erosion Results
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Figure 1-4: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Biomass Harvested Results
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If upstream participants are concerned with environmental outcomes but do not
want to incur additional costs, then a strategy of choosing plant locations in absence of
paying for additional conservation practices may be preferred. When considering the
scenario NoConservation_LowErosionCost, several soil types can sustainability (where
erosion is under 5 tons/acre) harvest stover without additional conservation and without
considering the private costs to erosion to the farmer or the biorefinery by locating the
biorefinery plant in these areas. In terms of market potential, there are approximately
54,485,964 acres that could harvest stover under the 5 ton/acre/year limits, distributed
throughout the five state sample area under the assumption of a continuous corn rotation,
not restricted to land currently in production (Figure 1-3). If we include a constraint on
soil organic matter, the number of acres decreases to 27,082,748. Conservatively, the
amount of stover that could be sustainably harvested on these acres is approximately
183.9 million tons, which is in line with the amount estimated by the BTSU (U.S.
Department of Energy, 2011), if all of these acres were in continuous corn.
Concentrations and in the regional markets will be more critical in determining where
and how this market develops.
Market development is going to be dependent on supply and land management
concerns described throughout the introductory section. Considerations on density of
yields and rotations may then delineate the supply shed. In some cases, the market will
incentivize the use of conservation in order to output larger stover harvests. On the
demand-side, the additional quantities harvested from any one producer may decrease
total facility transactions costs and adding additional incentives for local production may
offset transportation costs. The structure of the market, in terms of competitiveness, may
adjust the relative prices between conservation, harvest rates and transportation, such that
only the farmers with the lowest average cost will participate, e.g. the soil types that need
no conservation to harvest sustainably. This is an important consideration when
considering the potential market for stover biomass and recommendations for
management strategies. Although there are several aspects to this problem that will
change the supply region and density, it is key to analyze these issues at a finer detail.
The state and soil type analysis in this chapter will emphasize the differences at the
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regional level. In Chapter 2, this is analyzed more closely using representative supply
sheds around existing biofuel plants, building on the analysis in this chapter and taking
into account aggregation, transportation and market-level integration. Chapter 2 will also
focus more on incentive structures that will induce some of the outcomes in this chapter.
In addition to the concerns over supply and land management, the contribution of
stover to soil conservation and nutrient replacement will be an important aspect of the
farmer decision making process. Nutrient replacement from erosion is difficult to
generalize, as many farmers use soil testing in order to determine which nutrients are
lacking in the soil. Losses due to erosion are specific to soil type, location and type of
erosion and may not be considered separately. Therefore, the estimates from Pimentel
(1995) may be much larger than what is actually needed.

The erosion-nutrient

replacement illustrates the difference in possible behaviors if farmers have much lower
nutrient replacement figures. The USDA uses erosion nutrient replacement rates of
(2.32-1-0)

in NPK lbs./acre in their benefit-cost analysis for the program EQUIP

(Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2010). These rates are significantly lower than
those in Pimentel and, as such, the additional costs brought on by nutrient behavior,
coupled with the low rates of erosion after the adoption of cover crops, do not spur any
major regime changes.
However, when testing against the adoption of conservation management
strategies (no-till, cover crops, vegetation barriers), the ‘price’ of erosion can determine
how much biomass is removed and what the resulting level of erosion will be. The price
of erosion is considered through the alternatives of controlling for it, land values or
replacement costs, instead of a defined market. Nutrient replacement rates are also
reflective in the costs of harvesting stover, and are weighed with practices that will
increase the amount of biomass available (e.g. cover crops), the costs of replacing for
erosion, and the yields with respect to grain. Different studies indicate that nutrients
within the stover can vary greatly in NPK content of the final product (Jeschke and
Heggenstaller, 2012). Although the economic relationship is linear and straight forward,
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these offsetting costs and benefits complicate incentives as management choices have
interrelated outcomes when it comes to the costs of inputs.
1.6.1. Iowa
The optimal management choice for a majority (78%) of soil types or 25.2 million acres
under the Socially Optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium high
residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no vegetative barrier. Under this scenario,
average profit per acre was $722, averaging 2.2 tons/acre of biomass, with an average
erosion rate of 0.49 tons/acre/year and ranges in the state from 0.01 to 2.07 tons/acre/year
(Table 1-6). One hundred percent rye cover is the preferred cover crop for most of the
harvested areas in this scenario, though two Iowa soil types chose a 60% rye, 40% radish
cover crop, indicating that optimal erosion benefits were gained at a lower cost. When
analyzing soil types that did not choose the above management, 17% of land in Iowa
chose not to harvest any stover. Although, these soil types used 100% rye cover crop to
minimize the effects of erosion, rates averaged 0.49 tons/acre/year. Soil displacement
through erosion results in approximately 105.53 million tons for this conservative
scenario, with 89.8 million tons attributable to land harvesting stover. Given that erosion
has a high internal cost in this scenario, the usage of cover crops is warranted in order to
maintain the quality and quantity of soil, even in the absence of stover harvested.
Potentially, 25.2 million acres could harvest 477.1 million tons of stover under this
scenario. However, this is assuming that farmers will have a cost for erosion and thus the
incentive to minimize erosion rates through the adoption of 100% rye cover. When the
internalized cost of erosion is much lower or non-existent, and there are no sustainability
limits, cover crops are not chosen by the optimization model.
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Table 1-6: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Iowa (n= 4493)
Average Nutrient Usage
Scenario

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acr
e)

Range
for
Erosion
(tons/acre)

Average
Erosion
(tons/acre
)

Range for
SCI

Average
for SCI

N
(lbs./acre)

P
(lbs./acre)

K
(lbs./acre)

Socially Optimal

722.41

0 - 3.34

2.218

0.01 2.07

0.490

0.5 - 1.5

0.825

289.326

85.905

189.760

NoCover
NoErosionRR

720.97

1.65 - 3.07

2.517

0.01 –
18.14

2.374

-5.1 - 0.81

0.440

268.587

82.884

131.755

HighStoverP

832.26

0 - 4.43

2.618

0.01 3.25

0.761

0.4 - 1.31

0.744

302.922

89.133

239.109

LowStoverP

648.96

0 - 3.16

0.350

0.01 0.88

0.143

0.64 1.61

1.131

236.529

69.785

79.590

TvalueErosion

781.70

0 - 3.34

2.702

0.01 - 5

0.981

0.712

292.787

89.788

142.017

0.231

0.04 28.48

3.431

0.22 1.06
-1.74 0.96

0.382

264.368

63.042

502.985

3.659

0.14 44.87

14.331

-3.43 0.44

-0.980

308.083

100.898

166.775

NoConservation_
HighErosionCost
NoConservation_
LowErosionCost

322.93

648.03

0 - 4.16

0 - 4.54
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When considering the benefits of cover crops in Iowa, the difference between
average profit is $1.45 per acre when comparing the Socially Optimal and the
NoCoverNoErosionRR scenarios, which means that the incentives to adopt cover crops
are almost non-existent. In the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, all except one of the soil
types is harvesting at the medium harvest rate resulting in a 21% increase in area (5.1
million additional acres) over the Socially Optimal scenario. The absence of cover crops
affected the quantity of stover that was harvestable. When analyzing the effects of cover
crops on the distribution of profits for these scenarios (Figure 1-5), some soil types will
have lower profits than the socially optimal case. The difference in profits is threefold
and can be attributed to both the decrease in replacement costs, the decrease in stover
available and the increase in harvested biomass area. The spatial differences in erosion
rates between these two scenarios can be seen in Figure 1-1and Figure 1-7.

Figure 1-5: Distribution of Profits for the Scenarios NoCoverNoErosionRR, Socially
Optimal and TvalueErosion
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One of the concerns of not using conservation management (cover crops,
conservation tillage, barrier strips), while incentivizing the stover market, is the increase
in potential erosion and the decline in soil quality. From a profitability standpoint,
following the non-binding USDA guidelines will result greater profits (TvalueErosion)
than in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario (both scenarios have no internal cost for
erosion).

For both scenarios, 30.32 million acres are harvested.

In terms of soil

displacement, the TvalueErosion results in approximately 211.6 million tons (210.6
million tons to land with stover removal) and in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario,
displacement is approximately 515.3 million tons for land harvesting stover. However,
the potential for stover harvested in the TvalueErosion scenario is 587.68 million tons,
compared to the 539.1 million tons harvested in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario.
This means that farmers wanting to participate in the stover market would be incentivized
to use cover crops if their optimal rotation is continuous corn, regardless of internalized
erosion costs or regulatory constraint. As an added benefit, total erosion would decrease
almost threefold.

The amounts of stover harvestable over 30.2 million acres is

approximately 587.7 million tons for TvalueErosion, and 30.3 million acres harvest 539.1
million tons of stover, assuming continuous corn in all acres.

Figure 1-6: Optimal Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Iowa
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When we consider the spatial aspects of incentivizing different conservation
practices with the resulting economic gains from additional harvested area, these
differences become more pronounced. When comparing this to the outcomes when cover
crops (NoCoverNoErosionRR) are not used, the spatial outcomes of erosion and harvest
rates are quite different (Figure 1-7). Approximately, 26.79 million acres, without the
use of cover crops are within sustainable erosion limits. Analyzing the results at the soil
level,

taking

away

the

cost

of

erosion

and

not

installing

cover

crops

(NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario) results in a decrease of approximately 0.29 tons/acre in
biomass harvested for 78 percent of the soil types, including those that are under USDA
limits. Alternatively, for the 12 percent of soil types that see an increase in harvest rates,
the average additional increase in harvested stover is approximately 2.19 tons/acre. Both
effects result in an additional 61 million tons harvested over the Socially Optimal
scenario. Comparing Figure 1-6 and Figure 1-8, the increase in harvest rates comes
mainly from the southern area of the state where in the socially optimal case, very little
stover if any was being harvested. When comparing the NoCoverNoErosionRR and the
TvalueErosion scenarios, the results indicate that almost 99 percent of soil types would
harvest biomass, at lower harvest rates (Figure 1-5).

Figure 1-7: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Erosion Results for Iowa
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Figure 1-8: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Iowa

From this perspective, the biomass harvested and erosion tradeoffs are going to be
localized, as opposed to uniform over the supply shed region. Farmers receive the
benefits of cover crops in lower rates of erosion and higher rates of stover removal in a
continuous corn rotation. Requiring erosion control over the USDA suggested limits and
the market-based incentives would likely not be needed in the continuous corn rotation
and will be considered for other rotations in section1.6.7. If more acres are required or
higher rates of removal, the biorefinery would need to weigh whether or not the
additional tonnage harvested or increased participation within the supply shed would
account for the additional economic costs of incentivizing certain management regimes.
Although, it is unknown what the true costs to farmers are with respect to erosion, these
scenarios illustrate the potential outcomes when incentives for environmental
conservation and harvesting biomass can work together.
The potential for environmental damage (Figure 1-11) is considered when farmers
choose not to use any conservation practice and have low internal erosion costs
(NoConservation_LowErosionCost). For Iowa, this could mean that soil erosion rates
average 14.3 tons/acre/year with a maximum of 44.87 tons/acre/year coupled with
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negative SCI values for 95% of the soil types.

Farmers in this scenario are still

maximizing profits and still choosing a rotation of continuous corn. Respectively, the
rate at which biomass is harvested increases substantially throughout the state (Figure
1-12). It raises questions of whether harvesting stover without conservation management
would be sustainable in the long-run for half of the state. The market, regulation or
contracts may be needed to incentivize monitoring or alternative practices in these areas
to ensure sustainable rates of erosion.

Figure 1-9: TvalueScenario Erosion Results for Iowa
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Figure 1-10: TvalueScenario Biomass Harvest Results for Iowa

Figure 1-11: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Erosion Results for Iowa
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Figure 1-12: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for
Iowa

Soil characteristics, yields and management practices are the main differences in
the quantities of stover that are harvestable throughout the state. Considering these
differences, a change in the base price for stover may disproportionately alter the size and
density of the supply shed. As farmers weigh the tradeoffs with nutrient replacement and
stewardship activities with the price of stover, some areas may not be as responsive to
changes in prices with changes in harvested quantities (HighStoverP and LowStoverP).
In response to a shift in higher prices, ceterus paribus, from $80 to $125 per ton, 82% of
land in Iowa was perfectly inelastic and harvest rates remained the same, 21% were
perfectly elastic and harvest rates increased from 0 to an average of 2.56 tons/acre, and
the remaining 3% were almost unitary elastic (-.89 to -.93). A downward shift in prices
results in a different response structure. A shift from $80 to $34.03 per ton (which
includes the harvesting costs but not nutrient replacement or erosion costs) results in 21%
of soil types still harvesting nothing, 34% were inelastic in supply (-0.09 to -0.11)
resulting in an average decrease of 0.176 tons harvested, and 32% were elastic in supply,
decreasing from average of 2.79 tons/acre to 0 harvested. Lower prices still incentivize
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the adoption of cover crops in these areas that do decide to harvest, as a result of higher
quantities that are available for harvest.
1.6.2. Illinois
The optimal choice for Illinois, under the Socially Optimal scenario was
continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no
vegetative barrier for all soil types. Nineteen percent of the 4469 soil types, or 21.02
million acres, chose not to harvest any stover and two soil types chose the 60% rye, 40%
radish cover crop. Under this scenario, average profit per acre was $710, averaging 2.22
tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion was 0.496 tons/acre/year. For those that did
not harvest, profit averaged $706 and erosion rates averaged 0.48 tons/acre (Table 1-7).
The Socially Optimal scenario encourages low erosion rates throughout the state, and
results in 2.6 million tons of soil displacement, with 2.3 million tons attributed to stover
harvested lands (Figure 1-1). The quantities of stover harvested in this scenario are
approximately, 12,032 million tons of stover annually.
The comparison between the Socially Optimal and the NoCoverNoErosionRR
scenarios indicates that the inclusion of cover crops has a significant effect – 4.5
tons/acre/year on average erosion.

In total, erosion for the NoCoverNoErosionRR

scenario is estimated to be 26.59 million tons of soil displaced. The effectiveness of
cover crops is apparent in the southern counties, where erosion and harvest rates increase
significantly between these two scenarios. In areas, that did not harvest stover in the
Socially Optimal, an increase of 16.3 million tons of soil erosion occurs. Cover crops
also led to higher rates of biomass removal in 28% of the soil types. The difference in
total quantities of stover removed between these scenarios is an increase 2.77 million tons
for the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario. In the Socially Optimal case, in counties like,
Carroll (17015) and Woodford (17203), cover crops allow for an additional 0.23
tons/acre and 024 tons/acre respectively to be harvested sustainably (Figure 1-13). This
implies that farmers in these counties will not likely need additional incentives or
regulation in order to harvest stover and use cover crops, when considering participating
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in the stover market. Between these two scenarios, the use of cover crops increases the
area in which biomass can be harvested at a higher rate with lower rates of erosion.

Figure 1-13: Optimal Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Illinois

The comparison between the Socially Optimal and the TvalueErosion scenarios
indicates that private costs attached to erosion can impact which soil types and farmers
will be likely to participate in the biomass market. If farmers see a higher cost of erosion,
then 13 percent of the state of Illinois will not harvest any biomass. However, if farmers
are merely concerned with being compliant with t-values and do not internally reflect
private costs for erosion, than the area that will harvest stover increases to almost 100%
percent of the state. The amount of soil that is displaced in the TvalueErosion scenario is
approximately 5.04 million tons/year, with 2.6 million ton increase over the Socially
Optimal scenario coming from the 3.08 million acres that would choose to harvest and
practice cover crops.
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Table 1-7: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Illinois (n = 4485)
Average Nutrient Usage
Scenario

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

Range
for
Erosion
(tons/
acre)
0.01 1.76
0.02 59.98
0.01 3.26

Socially Optimal

706.83

0 - 3.1

2.209

NoCover
NoErosionRR

699.33

1.98 - 3.73

2.668

HighStoverP

815.75

0 - 4.58

2.726

LowStoverP

640.66

0 - 2.93

0.097

0 - 0.86

0.112

TvalueErosion

761.07

0 - 3.1

2.604

0.01 4.99

0.907

NoConservation_
HighErosionCost

309.37

0 - 4.28

0.172

0.07 28.04

3.482

NoConservation_
LowErosionCost

643.63

0 - 4.31

3.632

0.63 53.81

13.476

Average
Erosion
(tons/
acre)
0.488
4.397
0.762

Range for
SCI
0.51 1.46
-4.41 0.74
0.38 1.22
0.58 1.49
0.22 1.09

Average
for SCI

N
(lbs./acre)

P
(lbs./acre)

K
(lbs./acre)

0.741

285.552

84.868

188.566

0.196

265.769

82.378

135.646

0.648

299.572

88.407

241.731

1.047

227.179

66.934

66.352

0.653

286.606

87.937

137.906

-1.84 0.86

0.276

262.200

62.128

507.368

-4.17 0.33

-0.945

304.330

99.515

165.637
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Figure 1-14: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Erosion Results for Illinois

Figure 1-15: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Illinois
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Areas in the southern counties of the state can minimize the potential for
environmental damage through the usage of cover crops and by choosing lower harvest
rates. These areas are of concern when considering a lack of conservation management,
as can be seen in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario.

For areas that have over 5

tons/acre/year of erosion in the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, the contribution to the
stover market could potentially be 3.8 million tons of stover, with a respective 20.52
million tons of erosion. The southern areas of the state contribute 2.2 million tons of
stover and 16.4 million tons of erosion to these totals.

In comparison to the

TvalueErosion scenario these sensitive areas would only contribute 1.45 million tons of
soil displacement if 100% rye cover crop were used. Plus, of the 2.1 million acres of
environmentally sensitive areas, 187,796 acres would not participate in the stover market
under the TvalueErosion constraints. Incentives and regulations in this market will have
the potential to impact land areas in production and the rate that stover could be
harvested.

Figure 1-16: Tvalue Scenario Erosion Results for Illinois
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Figure 1-17: Tvalue Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Illinois

Although the NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario represents an extreme
case, the potential for incentivizing stover removal in these sensitive areas without
ensuring conservation practices, will have significant environmental effects. These areas
that have erosion rates over 10 tons/acre/year (which ends up being 42% of the state)
have the potential to contribute 9.8 million tons of biomass but disproportionately add
over 61.1 million tons of erosion, without conservation management practices. For the
same region, in the TvalueErosion scenario, the contribution of biomass is 7.8 million
tons with an erosion potential of 14.6 million tons of soil displacement. For the areas of
the state that would still be sustainable (under 5 tons /acre/year of erosion), 10.3 million
acres would be able to supply 6.517 million tons of stover annually. However, 8.9
million acres report a negative SCI, which means that even though erosion thresholds are
under recommended limits, soil organic matter would still be at risk for degradation.
Comparing the difference in amounts harvested on the 8.9 million acres, in the

46
TvalueErosion and the NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario, the difference in
positive and negative SCI through the practice of cover crops and no-till conservation, is
approximately 1.57 million tons of stover.

Figure 1-18: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Erosion Results for Illinois
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Figure 1-19: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for
Illinois
As farmers weigh the tradeoffs with nutrient replacement and stewardship
activities with the price of stover, some areas may not be as responsive to changes in
prices with changes in harvested quantities (HighStoverP and LowStoverP). In response
to a shift in higher prices, ceterus paribus, from $80 to $125 per ton, 67% of land in
Illinois was perfectly inelastic and harvest rates remained the same, 19% were perfectly
elastic and harvest rates increased from 0 to an average of 2.72 tons/acre and the
remaining 12% were almost unitary elastic (-.88 to -.97). A downward shift in prices
results in a different response structure. A shift from $80 to $34.03 per ton (which
includes the harvesting costs but not nutrient replacement or erosion costs) results in 19%
soil types being perfectly inelastic and harvest rates did not change from harvesting
nothing, 80% were inelastic in supply (-0.09 to -0.13) resulting in an average decrease of
2.21 tons harvested.
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1.6.3. Indiana
The optimal choice for all soil types for management under this scenario was
continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye cover crop, with no
vegetative barrier for all soil types. Under this scenario, average profit per acre was
$668, averaging 2.05 tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion was 0.42 tons/acre/year.
The significant result of this case is the overall low level of erosion from the adoption of
cover crops and no-till for most areas of the state (Figure 1-1). For 14.9 million acres
that would harvest stover, the erosion potential is 51.6 million tons of soil per year with
308.78 million tons of stover harvested. The 3.6 million acres that choose not to harvest
in the optimal scenario have erosion rates under 0.13 tons/acre and result in
approximately 11.43 million tons of soil displaced.
The contribution of conservation through the use of cover crops is significant for
several areas within the state. Under the NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, the average
amount of erosion increased 5.4 tons/acre/year, though the upward bound on erosion
increased from 1.72 tons/acre to 74.5 tons/acre. The net soil erosion for the state under
this scenario is 881.08 million tons of displaced soil. Biomass totals for the state increase
to 409 million tons of stover harvested annually. Farmers in this scenario still have the
option of adopting no-till and vegetative barrier strips, though none chose to adopt
vegetative barrier strips. The 3.6 million acres that were not producing in the Socially
Optimal scenario (Figure 1-2) produce 101.22 million tons of stover with 603.6 million
tons of soil displaced through erosion. The same area, under the TvalueErosion scenario
has the potential to produce 74.7 million tons of biomass and displace 87.8 million tons
of soil. These are areas in which a market for stover has the highest potential in Indiana
to create negative environmental externalities.

When considering whether or not a

market would incentivize the usage of cover crops, consider that average profits for this
scenario was $27 less than the Socially Optimal scenario; which is less than the costs of
the cheapest cover crop option in the model.
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Table 1-8: Selected Estimates From Model Scenarios For Indiana (Soil types = 2941)
Average Nutrient Usage
Scenario

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

Socially Optimal

668.88

0-3

2.054

NoCover
NoErosionRR

647.72

1.81 - 4

2.710

HighStoverP

767.89

0 - 4.51

LowStoverP

606.49

TvalueErosion

Range
for
Erosion
(tons/
acre)
0.01 1.72

Average
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

Range for
SCI

Average
for SCI

0.419

0.48 - 1.4

0.726

0.02 74.49

5.785

-5.54 0.71

2.495

0.01 - 3.2

0.642

0 - 2.8

0.190

0 - 1.29

0.129

724.32

0-3

2.543

0.01 4.99

0.918

NoConservation_
HighErosionCost

228.42

0 - 4.13

0.145

0.04 61.88

NoConservation_
LowErosionCost

598.78

0 - 4.21

3.381

0.4 61.88

N
(lbs./acre)

P
(lbs./acre)

K
(lbs./acre)

272.192

81.262

172.438

0.046

256.991

80.064

135.158

0.651

283.940

84.267

216.418

0.992

220.933

65.322

70.037

0.2 - 1.03

0.629

277.430

85.335

134.280

3.978

-4.48 0.82

0.203

260.899

59.868

570.188

13.988

-4.58 0.28

-0.98

291.850

95.872

155.490

0.37 1.08
0.58 1.45
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Therefore, the profit incentive may be there for several areas of the state, but when the
difference in profit is less than the cost of using a cover crop, farmers may forgo the
environmental benefits to gain economic ones, at least in the short-run. Biomass is also
harvested from 873,899 acres that have erosion rates above the 5 tons/acre threshold that
were sustainably producing stover in the TvalueErosion and Socially Optimal scenarios.
These areas may need either the regulatory enforcement or other incentives to ensure that
erosion rates can remain within sustainable limits and that cover crops are part of the
management strategy.

Figure 1-20: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Erosion Results

Under the NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario, average erosion increases
to over 14 ton/acre/year. The amount of soil displaced in this extreme scenario is 2.11
billion tons of soil and the amount of stover harvested increases to 510 million tons. In
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every soil type, not practicing conservation management, results in lower stover
harvested and lower profits than under the TvalueErosion scenario. This is in part due to
87% of the soil types adopting a higher harvest removal rate, thus increasing costs of
nutrient replacement.

Alternatively, with erosion replacement costs being high

(NoConservation_HighErosionCost), erosion averages 3.98 tons/acre/year but biomass
removal decreases to the no harvest removal rate for 5% of the soils. One of the
conclusions of these results is that farmer behavior will depend on perceived costs of
erosion and erosion prevention measures and how the outcomes affect stover harvested.
For the cases in which farmers must pay the erosion costs via nutrient replacement, they
typically adopted no-till or cover crops to prevent erosion, in some soils regardless of the
stover market. For the cases in which we forced no erosion reduction practices, erosion
increased substantially (Figure1-21). These cases are a proxy for the farmer either not
perceiving erosion costs as real or perceiving the costs of erosion prevention as being
high or some combination of the two. Under the NoConservation_LowErosionCost
scenario, 5.9 million acres have the potential to harvest 142.6 million tons of stover,
under sustainable erosion limits. Of these totals, adding in a sustainability factor for soil
organic matter decreases the acreage to 1.3 million acres and a total of 22.43 million tons
of biomass. These acres displace of 13.4 million tons of soil, which is a significantly
lower impact compared to the other areas of the state under this scenario.
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Figure1-21: No Erosion Costs or Conservation Management (NoConservation_
HighErosionCost) Scenario Erosion Results
Several areas of the state would benefit from conservation management strategies.
When considering the TvalueErosion scenario, harvest rates range throughout the state as
much as the Socially Optimal case, erosion rates are under 5 tons/ acre/year and profits
are $55 greater on average. In both cases, soil types were practicing 100% rye cover
crops. There were also 18,204 acres choosing to install vegetative barriers in addition to
the cover crop in order to meet the erosion threshold and to harvest biomass at a medium
high harvest rate. These acres choose not to harvest any stover in the Socially Optimal
case. From an environmental perspective if there is an enforceable limit to erosion,
farmers will weigh the additional benefits of each practice with their respective costs and
benefits.
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1.6.4. Nebraska
The optimal choice for a majority of soil types for management under the Socially
Optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye
cover crop, with no vegetative barrier for all soil types. Only 2 percent of the soil types
choose not to harvest any stover at the socially optimal rates. Under this scenario,
average profit per acre was $844, averaging 2.8 tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion
was 0.28 tons/acre/year. For this scenario 23.3 million acres harvest 68.43 million tons
of biomass. The erosion outcome for this scenario is 8.13 million tons of soil displaced.
In the TvalueErosion scenario, 660,804 more acres enter the stover market, producing 70
million tons of biomass, eroding 9.23 million tons of soil. It is important to note, that one
of the significant benefits of stover in Nebraska is its contribution to moisture
management in the soil, which is not captured in these integrated models. Also, these
models do not differentiate irrigated land. Both need to be considered in future work.
In the extreme case (NoConservation_LowErosionCost), there are 23.98 million
acres that harvest 72.68 million tons of biomass. Similar to the outcomes of the other
states, the increases in erosion is substantial, as 206.43 million tons of soil are displaced.
In terms of land that can still be sustainably harvested for stover in this scenario,
approximately 10.6 million acres could contribute 25.49million tons of biomass. Though
given the low density to area harvest rates, a market for stover without conservation
management would be limited. When considering aggregation potential with other states
in the sample, these acres are on the western side of the state, and it may not be
economically feasible to transport quantities of stover over that significant of a distance.
The western half of the state, measuring 200 miles from the western border, contains 8.9
million acres of land, which can produce upwards of 20.9 million tons of biomass in the
NoConservation_LowErosionCost scenario. If we impose sustainability constraints on
erosion, then this area can sustainability harvest 16.06 million tons of biomass without
any conservation practices. The net erosion for these acres is 13.29 million tons of soil
displaced.
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Table 1-9: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Nebraska (Soil types =2980)
Average Nutrient Usage
Scenario

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

Range
for Erosion
(tons/ acre)

Average
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

Range for
SCI

Average
for SCI

Socially Optimal

844.70

0 - 3.51

2.871

0 - 1.88

0.282

0.55 - 1.32

0.777

NoCover
NoErosionRR

768.92

1.92 - 3.52

2.654

0.01 - 64.21

1.347

-4.73 0.85

976.08
726.98
871.23

0 - 3.95
0 - 3.33
2.11 - 3.51

2.956
2.045
2.939

0 - 2.66
0 - 0.7
0 - 4.65

0.326
0.126
0.332

484.68

0 - 3.91

0.662

0.02 - 16.43

651.86

0 - 4.69

3.011

0.05 - 47.54

HighStoverP
LowStoverP
TvalueErosion
NoConservation_
HighErosionCost
NoConservation_
LowErosionCost

N
(lbs./acre)

P
(lbs./acre)

K
(lbs./acre)

319.798

96.220

188.536

0.511

281.608

86.664

138.395

0.4 - 1.15
0.6 - 1.57
0.29 - 1.15

0.760
0.877
0.763

322.194
296.765
316.957

96.833
89.188
96.775

197.094
139.592
153.827

1.605

-0.81 0.94

0.487

243.395

65.919

277.582

8.017

-3.67 0.64

-0.36

281.834

90.301

145.291
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If we further constrain this area with a positive SCI metric, then the contribution to the
stover market decreases to 14.8 million tons of stover.

Figure 1-22: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Erosion Results for Nebraska

When considering the motivations for cover crop usage in the state, the
NoCoverNoErosionRR scenario, the average profit is significantly lower than both the
TvalueErosion and the Socially Optimal scenario. Biomass supplied in this scenario on
the 23.9 million acres, is approximately 63.14 million tons of biomass. The contribution
of cover crops allows for roughly 6.9 million more tons of biomass to be harvested. In
addition, 1.9 million tons are supplied at unsustainable rates of erosion. The addition of
cover crops and a decrease in harvest rates in the TvalueErosion scenario decreases the
amount of soil displaced to 9.23 million tons of soil and increases the amount of biomass
harvested to 70 million tons. The difference in harvest rates can be seen in Figure 1-23
and Figure 1-24, where the difference is in the tradeoffs between intensifying harvest
rates in some soil types(Figure 1-24) and having a more uniform harvest rate (Figure
1-23).
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Figure 1-23: TvalueErosion Scenario Biomass Results for Nebraska

Figure 1-24: NoConservation_LowErosionCost Scenario Erosion Results for Nebraska
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1.6.5. Minnesota
The optimal choice for a majority of soil types for management under the socially
optimal scenario was continuous corn, no-tillage, medium residue harvest, 100% rye
cover crop, with no vegetative barrier for all soil types. Two of the 3861 soil types chose
not to harvest any stover.

Under this scenario, average profit per acre was $802,

averaging 2.8 tons/acre of biomass, and average erosion was 0.28 tons/acre/year. For this
scenario 29 million acres have the potential to harvest approximately 122.647 million
tons of biomass. Erosion in the Socially Optimal scenario is approximately 12 million
tons of soil. The outcomes for the TvalueErosion scenario are similar with 122.78
million tons of biomass harvested with a net erosion outcome of 12.11 million tons of soil
displaced. These results are indicative that the internal costs of soil erosion in Minnesota
may have little impact on the sustainability outcomes or management choices above those
which are required by the USDA. A majority of the acres that are unaffected by soil
erosion costs are also those that grow limited amounts of corn grain. This will become
more apparent in the following section on land use and rotations.
Unlike other states in this analysis, the addition of cover crops, changes in
conservation practices and private costs to erosion do very little to the amount of erosion
throughout the state. Considering the differences between Figure 1-25, and Figure 1-27,
the rates of erosion are all under 5 tons/acre, regardless of the amount of stover removed.
One could infer that erosion will not be an issue for biomass removed in this state. Even
under the scenario where private costs to erosion are low and no conservation is
practiced, most of the state falls under sustainable erosion limits to removal. As such, we
assume that farmers will be profit maximizers and choose cover crops only as a means to
higher amounts of biomass available to harvest. Another non-market factor to consider in
this region is the time required to plant and kill cover crops and the amount of days
available for planting grain. The higher latitudes are often concerned with early spring
planting and the thawing of ground. If cover crops affect the length of time that it takes
for the ground to thaw, then the result that erosion rates change very little will dissuade
farmers from use.

These additional timing concerns are not considered.
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Table 1-10: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios for Minnesota (Soil Types = 3861)
Average Nutrient Usage
Scenario

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

Socially Optimal

802.20

0 - 3.17

2.830

0 - 1.93

0.278

0.56 - 1.24

0.786

735.74

1.72 - 2.93

2.550

0 - 5.99

0.664

0.14 - 0.81

929.65
681.80
825.57

2.04 - 3.17
0 - 3.02
2.04 - 3.17

2.833
2.113
2.833

0 - 2.52
0 - 0.85
0 - 2.52

0.280
0.166
0.280

516.77

0 - 4.34

1.155

0.02 - 8.04

632.62

1.51 - 4.34

3.261

0.04 30.46

NoCover
NoErosionRR
HighStoverP
LowStoverP
TvalueErosion
NoConservation_
HighErosionCost
NoConservation_
LowErosionCost

Range
for Erosion
(tons/ acre)

Average
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

Range for
SCI

Average
for SCI

N
(lbs./acre)

P
(lbs./acre)

K
(lbs./acre)

309.155

93.271

184.649

0.588

272.374

83.971

133.474

0.56 - 1.03
0.57 - 1.63
0.56 - 1.03

0.785
0.864
0.785

309.269
289.371
304.788

93.298
87.123
93.280

185.030
145.227
148.272

1.018

0.07 - 1.02

0.475

237.223

67.617

215.720

4.398

-2.27 - 0.53

-0.13

270.931

86.436

152.212
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Figure 1-25: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Erosion Results for Minnesota

Figure 1-26: NoCoverNoErosionRR Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Minnesota
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Figure 1-27: T-Value Scenario Erosion Results for Minnesota

Figure 1-28: T-Value Scenario Biomass Harvest Results for Minnesota
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1.6.6. Land Availability
One of the limiting factors that need to be considered is the current rotations of
farm land in the supply shed. While the main conclusions of the first chapter is that
farmers will choose to practice continuous corn in order to maximize the amount of
yearly profit that can be gained in the corn grain-stover optimization. However, with the
uncertainties in the marketplace the current decisions in regards to the corn-soybean
rotation may further limit the amount of acreage available in any given year for the
harvest of stover. When considering current rotations (Figure 1-29), the amount of land
available for corn stover may further increase or decrease depending on price fluctuations
for these commodities. Comparing the 2010-2012 crop rotations (Figure 1-29), to the
rotations from 2008-2010 (Figure 1-30), more land has transitioned into continuous corn
and into a corn-corn-soybean rotation. These changes in intensification of production
have an impact on the farmer’s decision making process when it comes to harvesting
stover, choosing optimal management and conservation strategies, and in terms of the
supply density, depth and fluctuations in the local stover market.
In addition, extensive production may have implications on what kind of spot
market may be available in years when droughts, floods and other conditions may affect
the amounts of actual stover in the field. Though there would be no guarantee that these
areas could ensure sustainability in harvesting stover, as a spot market would not
necessarily induce the usage of conservation tillage or cover crops. Areas indicated in
yellow transition from other crops, such as hay, alfalfa and pasture to corn and soybean
rotations, but may return to these alternative crops so their long-run usage is tentative.
Additionally, these expansions may be temporary given the proclivity of some of these
areas to be classified as highly erodible without conservation (Figure 1-3) or flood prone.
The intensive and extensive changes over time will have implications, not only for farmer
decision making, but also for the stover market, as stover available will ebb along with
land in production and under different rotation schemes.
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Figure 1-29.Corn and Soybean Crop Rotations for the Years 2010-2012 Using the Crop Land Data Layer
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Figure 1-30.Corn and Soybean Crop Rotations for the Years 2008-2010 Using the Crop Land Data Layer
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Table 1-11: Approximate Acreage in Rotations from the Cropland Data Layer12
Number
State
of Soil
CornCorn-CornCont. Corn
Types
Soybean
Soybean
Acreage – Rotation 2008-10
Iowa
4493
1,707,882
10,837,425
4,061,011
Illinois
4485
2,056,332
7,747,149
3,913,787
Indiana
2941
467,853
4,743,731
1,599,717
Nebraska
2980
1,734,801
3,984,195
2,795,332
Minnesota
3861
513,436
5,929,995
1,884,811
Acreage – Rotation 2010-12
Iowa
4493
1,883,565
11,706,908
4,290,872
Illinois
4485
2,012,979
9,100,727
4,201,822
Indiana
2941
483,664
5,040,424
1,526,425
Nebraska
2980
1,853,688
4,752,635
3,310,408
Minnesota
3861
615,681
6,577,917
1,987,092

Increases in acreage during these time periods are the result of market prices for both
corn and soybean, as every state had fluctuations in land within a continuous corn or corn
and soybean rotation scheme. Assuming a fixed area for a supply shed, these subtle
effects on land in these rotations will affect the planning decisions and the lengths of
contracts. Producers may adjust the amount of stover harvested based on these crop
rotations, as some crop rotations may be more or less prone to stover accumulation or
alternatively require more land preparation with greater potential for erosion concerns.
For example, assuming all else equal, if land shifts from continuous corn to cornsoybeans, a farmer in Iowa could shift from harvesting an average of 2.702 in continuous
corn (Table 1-6) 1.60 in corn-soybean rotation (Table 1-12) in tons/acre of biomass. This
decrease in stover harvested can be attributed to the change in profitability between
rotations and the difference in benefits for managements in the different rotations.

12

The acreage counts in Table 1-11 are approximates and vary slightly in comparison to the USDA
estimates for crops in any given year and the USDA doesn’t report acreage in different rotation schemes
and these are based on remotely sensed imaging techniques.
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Table 1-12: Selected Estimates from the T-value Erosion Model Scenarios Setting Crop Rotation to Corn-Soybean
Average Nutrient Usage
Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

260.67

0 - 2.19

1.60

260.67

0 - 2.19

1.60

Indiana

235.95

0 - 2.13

1.47

Minnesota

272.99

0 - 2.2

Nebraska

123.66

0 - 2.4

State

Iowa
Illinois

Range
for
Erosion
(tons/
acre)
0.02 7.95

Average
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

Range for
SCI

Average
for SCI

N
(lbs./acre
)

P
(lbs./acre
)

K
(lbs./acre
)

2.94

0 - 0.54

0.18

236.08

106.73

158.15

0.02 7.95
0.03 7.96

2.94

0 - 0.54

0.18

236.08

106.73

158.15

2.63

0 - 0.55

0.21

225.06

101.83

149.16

1.64

0-5

1.88

-0.3 0.66

0.28

234.81

107.67

161.27

1.40

0.01 - 5

1.19

0.41

237.97

80.92

107.16

-0.28 0.7
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In comparison to the continuous corn outcomes from the previous section, the amount of
biomass harvested is on average much lower, as many areas choose not to harvest. A
direct result of this is also lower rates of soil erosion. Returning, to the idea that land
availability and rotations will constrain market development, then prices and incentives
may need to reflect these differences. If farmers are unwilling to switch to a continuouscorn rotation, the profit motives of the stover market may be less attractive as farmers
capitalize the benefits of stover harvest over the time of crop rotation. Biorefineries and
upstream participants may need to look at larger supply areas in order to meet the supply
needs at the refinery, if prices and other incentives are not flexible. Farmers in different
rotations will also react differently to incentives based on erosion control, cover crops or
harvesting thresholds. In addition, this result will affect the length of time that farmers
and refineries may choose to contract for stover, as profits and erosion costs are adjusted
over the time of the rotation and the benefits of harvesting stover only occur in years
where corn is the rotated crop.
Although there are several soil types that would have low erosion rates, the
incidences of high yields, and crop rotations may also affect the ideal location of the
biorefinery. The analysis that has been undertaken with these scenarios assumes that
farmers can freely choose the best management options and where stover markets exist,
farmers for the most part would shift to a continuous corn rotation. However, the
outcomes of the optimization become inherently more interesting when considering that a
market for stover may not actually incentivize different rotations through the Corn Belt.
In terms of adoption of cover crops, the choice of 100% rye cover crop is no longer the
default choice, as the fraction of total soil types decreases (Table 1-13). The adoption of
a 100% rye cover cropping system decreases significantly, depending on state and soil
type. Considering the USDA t-value, if this policy is binding, farmers, biorefineries or
government have little incentive to increase conservation measures above limits already
established. As such it may not be efficient to incentivize one type of conservation
management, as the decreases in erosion may overshoot this threshold for certain soil
types and rotations. Additionally as farmers weigh the costs and benefits of the different
management scenarios, the balance between increased harvest and cover crops may not

67
spur their adoption. Even though typically, these areas choose not to adopt cover crops
which results in a decrease in the amount of stover harvested. There is also a greater
variation in the harvest rates. In several soil types it is no longer economically viable to
harvest stover in the socially optimal case.
Table 1-13: Management and Conservation Practices for Corn-Soybean Rotations
Practice

Iowa

Illinois

Indiana

Minnesota

Nebraska

Number of Soil Types
NCC
100rye
40rye, 60clover
60rye, 40radish
RT
NT
NRH
MRH
MHH
HRH
NVB
SVB

4493
0.65
0.35
0
0
0
1
0.95
0
0.01
0.04
1
0

4469
0.62
0.38
0
0.002
0
1
0.19
0
0.81
0
1
0

2874
0.64
0.35
0
0
0
1
0.89
0.002
0.03
0.08
0.94
0.06

3859
0.88
0.12
0
0.005
0
1
0.61
0
0.31
0.08
1
0

2908
0.82
0.17
0
0.04
0
1
0.50
0.001
0.46
0.06
1
0

Additional constraints to land availability are with the presence of drought and
resulting yield drags. Although there is no way to fully predict the causes of yield drag,
we proxy the effects of a 8 and 12 bushel per acre yield drag to see if there are any
underlying changes to the optimal scenarios for the states, reverting back to a majority of
soil types moving to continuous corn. The results can be found in Table 1-14 and show
that under conditions where there may be some yield drag farmers would still choose a
medium harvest rate, a continuous corn-rotation and participate in the stover market.
Farmers may also find additional incentives in participating in the stover market as a
means to compensate from lower incomes from grain harvested, unless the stover
becomes more valuable in terms of moisture management.
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Table 1-14: Selected Estimates from Model Scenarios Setting Yield Drag

Scenario
8/bu/ac
Iowa
Illinois
Indiana
Nebraska
Minnesota
12/bu/ac
Iowa
Illinois
Indiana
Nebraska
Minnesota

Profit
$/acre

Erosion
tons/acre/
year

Average
Biomass SCI
tons/
acre

718.63
703.17
618.88
841.49
799.18

0.492
0.498
0.428
0.289
0.293

2.077
2.080
1.936
2.732
2.705

716.77
701.31
593.67
840.01
797.64

0.494
0.497
0.434
0.295
0.302

2.008
2.004
1.878
2.670
2.644

N
lbs./
acre

P
lbs./
acre

K
lbs./
acre

0.812
0.727
0.712
0.762
0.768

286.496
283.176
259.174
317.273
307.185

84.879
83.956
77.475
95.264
92.452

185.382
185.546
167.599
184.783
182.540

0.805
0.722
0.705
0.754
0.758

285.118
281.607
252.644
316.269
306.263

84.377
83.403
75.575
94.853
92.056

183.300
182.847
165.240
183.621
181.719

1.6.7. Sustainability
Defining the sustainability criteria of stover harvesting has several factors that
need to be considered. As stated earlier, a greater percentage of stover may be required
to limit SOC losses, given that carbon turnover in the soil may be a slower process than
the effects of SOC on erosion (Johnson, et al., 2006, Johnson, et al., 2006, Wilhelm, et
al., 2007). Additionally to reiterate, the SCI is a metric that allows for planners to decide
whether or not a practice is going to degrade the soil, regardless of current soil
classification. Therefore, soil types that are degraded but still have a zero or positive SCI
are assumed not to degrade further. The metric does not place a value on farmers looking
to improve the soil organic matter through better residue management and use of cover
crops.

Gauging the benefits of these non-market services would depend on their

contribution to marketable goods (e.g. grain and soybeans), their inputs (e.g. higher
quality soils need less fertilizer) and the amount of time that would be required to
maintain or improve the resource, as both erosion and soil organic matter affect the
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medium to long-term outcomes of soil quantity and quality. We can attempt to distill a
shadow value on what this metric would mean for farmers in terms of a sustainability
constrained and unconstrained market.

When considering sustainability, scenarios

requiring limits on erosion and the SCI metric were undertaken in order to gauge the
different management strategies and economic outcomes based on land in production and
rotations. For the analysis, constraints on different metrics of sustainability were
considered.
If policy, markets or contracts further limit the availability of stover supply
through sustainability constraints on erosion or on the SCI, then it is important to
illustrate the potential shifts in supply availability. These constraints have potential
economic costs associated with each limitation, which are reflected in both the
profitability to farmers, harvest rates, and management choices. Assuming a base price
of $80, four different sensitivity scenarios were undertaken to see how costs and acreages
would change if farmers were bound by sustainability criteria on erosion and soil quality
(SCI).These scenarios indicate the potential with and without the consideration of limits
on soil erosion and soil condition. These scenarios were,
1. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion but the sustainability
thresholds were constraining (total erosion < 5 tons/acre/year, SCI >0).
2. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion but the sustainability
thresholds were constraining for just soil organic carbon (SCI >0).
3. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion but constraining total erosion
(total erosion < 5 tons/acre/year).
4. Assuming no internal replacement cost for erosion and no sustainability
thresholds were constraining.
Assuming that profit is going to be the driving factor in the decision to harvest stover,
some farmers optimal choices may already include the use of conservation management
as a means to harvest more stover. Therefore, relaxing these (regulatory) constraints may
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have little change in management choices or profits. Alternatively, as requiring stover
harvesting to be sustainable will change the marginal costs for harvesting stover, some
farmers will potentially decrease harvested amounts or choose not to participate.
Connecting these outcomes with the crop rotations (illustrated in Figure 1-29),
and ignoring the land that appears in the ‘Corn, at least one year’ category13. We can
illustrate the areas in which the addition of conservation practices will have economic
value without necessarily needing further regulatory or contract terms. Since the first
scenario, precludes looking at erosion rates, the important factors to consider are going to
be harvest rates, conservation usage (cover crop choice and vegetative barriers) and
profitability. Using the first scenario as a baseline to gauge the cost of relaxing the
environmental constraints, we can estimate the shadow value of each constraint. For the
$80 per ton price for stover, using a corn-soybean rotation, the effects of these
sustainability constraints on profit can be seen in Figure 1-31. Soil types in this figure
have been, ranked by profitability in the most constrained, Scenario 1. The spatial
distribution of these outcomes over space will not be as smooth and will need to be
accounted for within the supply shed and in terms of the changes based on crop rotation.
As expected, without an internal cost for erosion, profits for several of the soil
types increase as the constraints to sustainability are relaxed. In terms of the outcomes in
profitability, harvest rates, biomass, erosion and SCI metrics, the descriptive statistics for
the sustainability scenarios can be found in Table 1-15 to Table 1-18. This effect for the
corn-soybean rotation can be contributed to a greater amount of biomass harvested
(income effect), as well as, through a decrease in costs related to conservation or a
change in management strategy (substitution effect). However, the differences for
continuous corn in each state in terms of land, management and intensification were

13

This land may be transitioned in and out of other sources during the length of the contract and perhaps
would not be reliable for a contract-based supply chain. Though opportunities in the spot market may exist
and it may be possible to harvest stover from these acres, it may not be possible to ensure sustainability in a
single decision making period.
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small, as the profitable outcomes for this crop rotation, regardless of the sustainability
criteria, was the 100% rye cover crop. The difference in relaxing the sustainability
constraints had the greatest effect on the corn-soybean rotations in terms of increasing the
average profit range $87 to $173, whereas, for the more intensive system of corn-cornsoybeans, relaxing the sustainability criteria ended up decreasing the range of
profitability from ($47) to ($140).

In the corn-soybean rotations, the change in

profitability is mainly the effect of higher harvest rates and on average the opposite is
true in the corn-corn-soybean rotation. In terms of rates of erosion, in all scenarios the
average rate of erosion increases, as the sustainability factors are relaxed.
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Figure 1-31Profit Response to Sustainability Constraints in a Corn-Soybean Rotation
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Table 1-15: Selected Estimates from Scenario 1

State

IA

IL

IN

MN

NE

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

Range
for
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

Average
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

CB

780.68

0 - 3.34

2.69

0.01 - 4.96

0.98

CB,SB

292.79

0 - 2.31

1.49

0.02 - 5

2.90

CB,CG,SB

366.66

0 - 3.17

2.26

0.02 - 5

2.63

CB

767.48

0 - 3.1

2.67

0.01 - 4.99

0.91

CB,SB

259.95

0 - 1.54

1.54

0 - 2.77

2.77

CB,CG,SB

347.95

0 - 2.99

2.20

0.02 - 5

2.65

CB

724.32

0-3

2.54

0.01 - 4.99

0.92

CB,SB

234.65

0 - 1.47

1.47

0 - 2.48

2.48

CB,CG,SB

323.96

0 - 2.9

2.20

0.04 - 5

2.35

CB

825.57

2.04 - 3.17

2.83

0 - 2.52

0.28

CB,SB

273.76

0 - 1.62

1.62

0 - 1.75

1.75

CB,CG,SB

348.09

0 - 3.02

2.33

0-5

1.59

CB

871.23

2.11 - 3.51

2.94

0 - 4.65

0.33

CB,SB

123.37

0 - 1.54

1.39

0 - 2.77

CB,CG,SB

276.58

0 - 3.29

2.37

0.01 - 4.98

Rotation

Average
for SCI

N
(lbs./acre
)

P
(lbs./acre
)

K
(lbs./acre
)

0.71

292.43

89.68

141.71

0.24

233.51

111.71

164.63

0 - 0.91
0.22 1.09
0 - 0.21

0.28

248.97

179.67

236.00

0.65

289.09

88.73

140.40

0.21

235.20

106.28

155.91

0 - 0.71
0.2 1.03
0 - 0.22

0.23

247.31

172.86

223.22

0.63

277.43

85.33

134.28

0.22

225.28

101.97

149.34

0 - 0.51
0.56 1.03
0 - 0.3

0.24

240.18

167.41

217.57

0.79

304.79

93.28

148.27

0.30

234.56

107.71

160.84

0.33

246.51

172.29

226.78

0.76

316.96

96.78

153.83

1.14

0 - 0.74
0.29 1.15
0 - 0.21

0.42

237.83

80.87

106.96

0.94

0 - 0.75

0.44

257.57

151.82

186.10

Range
for SCI
0.22 1.06
0 - 0.72
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Table 1-16: Selected Estimates from Scenario 2

State

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

Range
for Erosion
(tons/ acre)

Average
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

Range for
SCI

Average
for SCI

787.07
295.84
373.00
768.56
260.67
351.26

1.86-3.34
0-2.31
0-3.17
0-3.1
0-1.6
0-2.99

2.74
1.61
2.44
2.70
1.60
2.33

0.01-7.14
0.02-7.17
0.02-7.65
0.01-7.35
0-2.94
0.02-7.31

1.01
3.15
2.89
0.98
2.94
2.83

0.11-1.03
0-0.6
0-0.58
0.01-0.94
0-0.18
0-0.51

0.71
0.20
0.24
0.64
0.18
0.20

294.67
236.39
254.47
289.75
236.08
250.52

90.37
112.72
182.21
88.96
106.73
174.43

143.65
168.91
243.12
141.37
158.15
228.33

CB

727.28
235.95
325.18
825.57
273.88
348.31
871.23

2.01-3
0-1.47
0-2.92
2.04-3.17
0-1.62
1.07-3.02
2.11-3.51

2.61
1.47
2.25
2.83
1.62
2.34
2.94

0.01-15.12
0-2.63
0.04-7.23
0-2.52
0-1.78
0-6
0-4.65

1.07
2.63
2.52
0.28
1.78
1.65
0.33

-0.58-0.92
0-0.21
0-0.51
0.56-1.03
0-0.29
0-0.61
0.29-1.15

0.61
0.21
0.22
0.79
0.29
0.33
0.76

278.98
225.06
241.16
304.79
234.61
246.56
316.96

85.87
101.83
167.83
93.28
107.71
172.28
96.78

136.49
149.16
219.27
148.27
160.95
226.89
153.83

CB,SB

123.61

0-1.6

1.40

0-2.94

1.19

0-0.18

0.41

238.12

80.94

107.27

CB,CG,SB

277.02

0-3.29

2.39

0.01-6.31

0.97

0-0.75

0.44

257.99

152.01

186.65

Rotation

CB
IA

CB,SB
CB,CG,SB
CB

IL

CB,SB
CB,CG,SB
CB

IN

CB,SB
CB,CG,SB
CB

MN

CB,SB
CB,CG,SB

NE

K
N
P
(lbs./acre) (lbs./acre) (lbs./acre)
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Table 1-17: Selected Estimates from Scenario 3

State

IA

IL

IN

MN

NE

CB

781.77

0-3.34

2.70

0.01-5.02

Averag
e
Erosio Range for
n
SCI
(tons/
acre)
0.98
0.22-1.06

CB,SB

260.67

0-2.19

1.60

0.02-7.95

2.94

0-0.54

0.18

236.08

106.73

158.15

CB,CG,SB

367.13

0-3.17

2.25

0.02-5

2.78

-0.3-0.91

0.26

248.59

179.47

235.68

CB

761.07

0-3.1

2.60

0.01-4.99

0.91

0.22-1.09

0.65

286.61

87.94

137.91

CB,SB

260.67

0-1.6

1.60

0-2.94

2.94

0-0.18

0.18

236.08

106.73

158.15

CB,CG,SB

349.07

0-2.99

2.20

0.02-5

2.79

-0.3-0.71

0.21

247.21

172.82

223.11

CB

724.32

0-3

2.54

0.01-4.99

0.92

0.2-1.03

0.63

277.43

85.33

134.28

CB,SB

235.95

0-1.47

1.47

0-2.63

2.63

0-0.21

0.21

225.06

101.83

149.16

CB,CG,SB

325.13

0-2.9

2.20

0.04-5

2.51

-0.34-0.5

0.23

240.08

167.36

217.46

CB

825.57

2.04-3.17

2.83

0-2.52

0.28

0.56-1.03

0.79

304.79

93.28

148.27

CB,SB

272.99

0-1.64

1.64

0-1.88

1.88

0-0.28

0.28

234.81

107.67

161.27

CB,CG,SB

349.08

0-3.02

2.34

0-5

1.83

-0.29-0.74

0.29

246.53

172.26

227.13

CB

871.23

2.11-3.51

2.94

0-4.65

0.33

0.29-1.15

0.76

316.96

96.78

153.83

CB,SB

123.66

0-1.6

1.40

0-2.94

1.19

0-0.18

0.41

237.97

80.92

107.16

CB,CG,SB

277.24

0-3.29

2.37

0.01-4.98

1.07

-0.29-0.75

0.42

257.31

151.69

185.88

Rotation

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

Range
for
Erosion
(tons/
acre)

Avera
ge for
SCI

N
(lbs./acre)

P
(lbs./acre)

K
(lbs./acre)

0.71

292.81

89.79

142.03

75

76

Table 1-18: Selected Estimates from Scenario 4

State

IA

IL

IN

MN

NE

Range
for Erosion
(tons/ acre)

Averag
e
Erosio
n
(tons/
acre)

Range for
SCI

Averag
e for
SCI

N
(lbs./acre
)

P
(lbs./acre)

K
(lbs./acre)

Average
Profit
($/acre)

Range for
Harvest
Rate
(tons/acre)

Average
Harvest
Rate
(tons/
acre)

CB

787.07

1.86-3.34

2.74

0.01-7.14

1.01

0.11-1.03

0.71

294.67

90.37

143.65

CB,SB

398.84

1.7-3.07

2.57

0.23-270.66

12.31

-20.97-0.4

(0.58)

258.43

184.10

248.24

CB,CG,SB

319.47

1.27-2.3

1.92

0.06-210.74

8.57

-16.25-0.42

(0.29)

247.13

116.39

180.57

CB

768.72

2.17-3.1

2.70

0.01-7.65

0.98

-0.01-0.94

0.64

289.81

88.98

141.44

CB,SB

375.79

2.05-2.9

2.55

0.39-172.02

10.08

-13.19-0.38

(0.44)

256.24

177.25

236.86

CB,CG,SB

283.21

0-1.91

1.91

0-7.83

7.83

0--0.26

(0.26)

245.01

110.07

169.69

CB

727.28

2.01-3

2.61

0.01-15.12

1.07

-0.58-0.92

0.61

278.98

85.87

136.49

CB,SB

346.60

1.86-2.84

2.45

0.58-154.82

12.99

-11.87-0.36

(0.68)

245.50

169.52

226.18

CB,CG,SB

253.56

0-1.83

1.83

0-9.84

9.84

0--0.43

(0.43)

234.71

104.96

161.63

CB

825.57

2.04-3.17

2.83

0-2.52

0.28

0.56-1.03

0.79

304.79

93.28

148.27

CB,SB

361.43

1.62-2.93

2.49

0.04-166.65

11.80

-12.76-0.44

(0.55)

249.60

173.48

232.03

CB,CG,SB

271.27

0-1.86

1.86

0-8.26

8.26

0--0.27

(0.27)

238.62

107.92

166.47

CB

871.23

2.11-3.51

2.94

0-4.65

0.33

0.29-1.15

0.76

316.96

96.78

153.83

CB,SB

296.87

1.19-3.18

2.52

0.01-425.96

42.96

-33.19-0.75

(2.98)

259.45

152.40

190.84

CB,CG,SB

135.78

0-1.91

1.89

0-7.83

29.29

0--0.26

(1.90)

248.28

84.26

123.14

Rotation
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Putting these results in terms of spatial outcomes, the changes in erosion from the
most constrained case (Scenario 1) to the least constrained (Scenario 4) there are
differences in terms of cover crop choices, erosion and biomass harvested.

These

differences in erosion can be seen in Figure and Figure 1-33. The total amount of erosion
that is created in the most constrained scenario is 248.89 million tons/year; in the least
constrained scenario soil displacement through erosion is estimated to be 99.6 million
tons of soil displaced. With harvest rates, the difference between these scenarios can be
found in Figure 1-34 and Figure 1-35. For example, in areas of Western Illinois, not
having sustainability constraints leads to more acres harvesting biomass. In areas of
eastern Nebraska this relaxation translates to higher rates of harvest. In 56% of the land,
there is no change in harvest rates. In 25%, the shift to the less constrained scenario
decreased harvest rates. And in the remaining 19%, the shift resulted in an increase in
stover harvested. The importance of these shifts is again going to play into the local
supply shed dynamics.
In comparison to the, NoConservation_LowErosionCost, there are regions in
which even without additional constraints the least constrained scenario can produce a
sustainable biomass market, in terms of erosion. There are approximately 32.9 million
acres of land that can be sustainably harvested without the additional constraints. This
area produces 75.7 million tons of biomass on a three-year planning horizon.

The

breakdown of these numbers can be found in Table 1-19.
Table 1-19: Harvesting in the Least Constrained Sustainability Scenario and Still Meeting
Sustainability Thresholds
Rotation
Corn-Soybean
Corn-CornSoybean
Continuous
Corn
Total

Acres
21,219,505

Biomass
42,806,537

Erosion
51,858,089

5,625,631

15,250,472

15,845,728

6,067,281

17,691,849

87,346,429

32,912,417

75,748,858

155,050,246
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Figure 1-32 Erosion Outcomes from Scenario 1
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Figure 1-33 Erosion Outcomes from Scenario 4
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Figure 1-34 Biomass Outcomes from Scenario 1
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Figure 1-35 Biomass Outcomes from Scenario 4
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Figure 1-36 Cover Crop Choice by Rotation for Scenario 1
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Figure 1-37: Unsustainable Regions in Terms of Erosion (>5 tons/acre) and SCI (negative)
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Figure 1-38 Shadow Values for Sustainability Constraints
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The differences in areas that can be sustainable harvested and areas in which relaxing the
constraints will lead to erosion rates increasing and soil organic matter to decline can be
found in Figure 1-37.

These are areas that may need to be targeted for specific

conservation activities, and would potentially be more efficient in terms of incentivizing
these practices.
When looking at the differences between optimal strategies in the constrained and
unconstrained outcomes, there are a few key conclusions. Much like the state-by-state
results, the continuous corn rotation optimal strategy is the 100% rye cover crop at the
$80/ton stover price.

The combination of cover crop and harvest rate is both the

economical and environmentally best outcome. For the other rotations, in the constrained
scenario, the choice of cover crop varies between 100% rye, 60/40 rye, radish and no
cover crop (Figure 1-36). When the sustainability constraints are relaxed the choice for
these other rotations defaults to no cover crop used. When considering the acreage
dimension, the results based on rotation and cover for the constrained scenario can be
found in Table 1-20. The difference between the constrained and unconstrained scenario
is the addition of 4.03 million acres in corn-corn-soybean; a decrease of 298,996 acres in
corn-soybean; and a decrease of 484 acres in continuous corn. In the scenario of relaxed
sustainability, all of the acres in corn-corn-soybean and corn-soybean do not practice a
cover crop. The acres in continuous corn remain (less the 484) in 100% rye and in 60/40
rye, radish.
Table 1-20: Acres by Cover Crop Regime and Rotation
Cover

Rotation
Corn-Corn-Soybean Corn-Soybean Continuous Corn

Total in Cover

100% Rye

2,858,664

473,307

6,064,614

9,396,585

60/40 Rye, Radish

3,228,172

7,213,568

2,697

10,444,437

No Cover

3,761,882

26,824,843

-

30,586,725

Total Acres

9,848,718

34,511,718

6,067,310

50,427,747
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One national policy that could be considered is the subsidization of cover crops as
a means to ensure that farmers within the market are producing stover sustainably.
However, given that farmers in many areas benefit from the usage of cover crops, the
potential subsidy of cover crops may not need to cover the entire price for the cover.
When analyzing the price that the usage of cover crops would cause farmers to be
indifferent between using cover crops and not, the median price for the 100% rye cover,
on a per acre basis was $20.40 and $20.65 for the 60-40 rye radish mix. The maximum
for these subsidies, to induce adoption was $36.50 for 100% rye and $26.20 for the 60-40
rye radish mix. If the subsidy were based on the area that would adopt the different cover
crops, than for 100% rye, the average $18.7 would induce adoption for 25% (183,030
acres) of the land in the sample region. For land that is in 100% rye, 77% of the acres did
not require a subsidy. These are acres that are typically in continuous corn and would
choose to practice the cover regardless of the sustainability criteria. For 60/40 rye radish
mix, the average of $20 would induce the adoption of 25% (2.6 million) of the acres.
Figure indicates the distribution of the subsidy based on acreage. However, these
averages based on the entire sample area are useful for national policy in terms of
increasing cover crop usage. Chapter 2 considers a more targeted approach that may not
need as costly subsidies to meet sustainability goals in localized markets.
Policies may be more effective in targeting regions or rotations where erosion
efforts are going to have the highest impact, than creating a singular policy for the entire
market. Locations in which constraining erosion and soil organic matter outcomes are
going to be the greatest are areas that will alternatively have large negative shadow
values. These areas can be seen in Figure 1-38. Although similar in pattern to the
regions in which harvesting stover in the unconstrained scenario, the value of these
constraints varies through the landscape for several reasons, given the costs and benefits
for using cover crops. Shadow values in Figure 1-38, which are over the median subsidy
prices, are gaining economic value at the cost of stewardship. Farmers in these regions
choose not to use cover crops and choose to harvest at higher rates of removal.
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60/40 Rye, Radish
250,000

Total Acres

200,000
150,000

100,000
50,000

12.0
17.1
17.9
18.3
18.6
18.9
19.2
19.4
19.7
19.9
20.1
20.4
20.6
20.8
21.0
21.2
21.5
21.7
22.1
22.4
22.8
23.7

Subsidy

Figure 1-39: Distribution of Acreage based on Subsidy Levels for 60% Rye, 40% Radish
Cover

70,000

100% Rye

60,000

Total Acres

50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
12.4
14.4
15.1
15.6
15.9
16.4
16.7
17.2
17.6
17.8
18.3
18.6
19.0
19.3
19.5
19.8
20.0
20.3
20.6
21.1
21.6
22.4
23.1

Subsidy

Figure 1-40: Distribution of Acreage based on Subsidy Levels for 100% Rye
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The farms that fall within the $0 to $39 categories, deem that the break even costs for
using a cover crop are not compensated by the biomass removed – either through a
decrease in harvest rates or through the additional costs in terms of nutrient replacement
for stover. As the cost differential increases, farmers reflected in the light blue and green
(max $80) regions reflect that the costs of compliance are preventing them from entering
the market. For areas with larger cost differentials, the decreases in profits for the most
constrained scenario are a result of less optimal management strategies, not just in
decreases related to not marketing stover.
When considering the larger market, the biorefinery may have several factors to
consider. If a soil type or region has the potential to substantially increase erosion runoff
or the soil carbon sustainability varies significantly dependent on farmer practices, the
refinery may choose to minimize areas with greater variation in outcomes within the
supply shed. Especially if there is a concern over sustainability but not necessarily the
incentive or regulation structure to enforce sustainability. There are several aspects to
consider about including or not including these areas. Farmers may be willing to bear the
costs of adopting cover crop practices in these highly erosive areas in order to participate
in the market or choose to mine their soil resources. Again farmers potentially weigh
non-market value of erosion with the market value for stover, as prices and incentives
change, the optimal choice will change.

From a contracting perspective, setting a

minimum quantity harvested or a price, farmers will then choose their optimal
management decision. If the farmer can meet the terms of the contract without any
additional management changes (as would be the case of an inelastic supply response)
then cover crops and conservation may or may not necessarily be used. From a policy
point of view, increasing the incentives and offsetting the costs of conservation through
biomass market may have positive externalities for society, though the costs to regulators
or the biorefinery will increase by requiring conservation. Alternatively, encouraging the
harvesting of corn stover in these sensitive areas, without the sustainability criteria, could
increase the degradation of important natural resources.
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CHAPTER 2: MARKET INTEGRATION AND THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSTRAINTS

2.1. Introduction
Securing feedstock supply is critical even prior to the establishment of a biorefinery.
Biofuel producers locate and secure feedstocks based on estimated supply areas with
ideally low-cost, high density producing biomass acres, decreasing both transaction and
transportation costs (Gallagher, et al., 2003, Lambert, et al., 2008). Once plants decide to
locate in an area, a supply and distribution system needs to be contracted and
implemented, implying that the market will be local and specialized. With an absence of
spot and futures markets, obtaining a steady supply of feedstocks will involve biofuel
plants contracting with farmers, or more likely intermediate aggregators, for the tasks of
production, harvest, storage, and delivery of biomass. Given the high costs and risks
associated with building second-generation biorefineries, securing the feedstock supply
chain commitments is a necessary step before plants break ground. These biomass
contracts will probably be multi-year contracts, spanning at least 3 to 5 years in order to
reduce market risk (Tyndall, et al., 2011). These contracts will fulfill the expected supply
needs of the plants while ensuring participation, being incentive compatible and
renegotiation proof for producers, meaning that after the contract is signed but before
delivery of the feedstock, the terms of the contract cannot be changed.
On the output-side, biorefineries are competing against other sources of energy
(e.g. gasoline or diesel) in output prices. As such, profit margins for the bioenergy
market are likely thin and variable, thus increasing pressure on input costs. Contracts are
one way for farmers and producers to reduce risks in production and set prices.
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For the biorefinery, the risks lie within the procurement of a steady supply of a single
feedstock within grades for quality. That is in addition to the other supply-side factors,
including bulk density, aggregation, and water content, that increase the costs of
transportation (Thompson and Tyner, 2011). Biofuel plants may be profitable when
producing at near capacity, though refineries may evaluate different supply options.
These options balance just-in-time delivery and the potential for undersupply with the
costs of storage and managing inventories with the potential for oversupply and
shutdown; depending on how much of the stover production risk the biorefineries
undertake.
As such, there are several goals that may or may not conflict with decision
making on farm, as the refinery establishes a low-cost, stable, long-term supply chain.
The general assumption is that biorefineries will need to use different pricing strategies
within these contracts as an effective means to, separate farmers in different rotations,
minimize transportation costs, meet supply and acreage targets, incentivize management
practices and improve the overall stability of supply. Farmer decision making will center
on the potential management and harvest choices. The environmental outcomes in terms
of erosion and soil organic matter, may limit the stover that could be produced on any
acre. In order to align these potentially conflicting incentives of the farmers and the goals
of the biorefinery, several production, harvest and storage activities will need to be
considered.
The first chapter provides context for the farmer decision making process within
the stover market, at the ground level. The analysis provides bounds to farmer activities
under different states of nature for the entire five state sample area, assuming a set price
for stover per ton. The analysis illuminates what the potential supply and environmental
outcomes could be in absence of competition and alternative pricing options. This
Chapter transitions from this wide perspective of stover supply in the Corn Belt, to the
potential tradeoffs for the fuel sheds and considers different price options as the
biorefineries aggregate supply. These price options were inspired through the lens of
principal-agent contracting framework, using the theories of incentive and production
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based pricing options. The analysis does not cover the breadth of contracting issues
involved in this market. Future work may cover the contracting aspects of this market and
the implications of these price structures on these biomass contracts, as they relate to
sustainability in the market.
Comparing different alternatives in terms of price, stover harvested and
environmental outcomes at the fuel shed will aid farmers, biorefineries and policy makers
in creating an efficient and sustainable marketplace with cost effective management
strategies. The modeling exercise and analysis will encourage thinking about this
problem in terms of the density and scope of the supply shed through the distance
traveled, quantity supplied and number of acres coupled with the environmental aspects
that change how this market can operate. Additionally, the analysis shows the potential
advantages and disadvantages for different price incentive structures in meeting
sustainability criteria under regulatory constraints. Furthermore, the application of this
problem can be used to think about harvesting stover for other uses, such as animal feed.
2.1.1. Considerations in Aggregation
One can envision the biorefinery decision making process as divided into two
phases. In the first phase, the biorefinery must decide on the quantity of stover it wants
to contract. Estimates for a switchgrass pilot plant are around 2,000 to 4,000 dry tons per
day (Epplin, et al., 2007). However, since biomass plants using stover are not yet at
commercial scale, it is uncertain how much biomass would be needed to meet production
goals. We will assume that a 70-mgy plant will need 571,000 tons of stover a year to run
at capacity. Deciding on the total amount demanded above or below this amount, must
take into account the uncertainty in supply from year to year due to weather and other
yield determining factors with the costs associated. For the biorefinery, the unknown
production risks may be mitigated through carrying inventories, especially if future
shortages are likely to increase marginal costs (Cheung, 1969). The biorefinery would
take all of this into consideration in determining the quantity it wants to contract each
year.
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Contracts will likely be framed to either secure supply based on acreage or on
tonnage or both depending on farmer and biorefinery risk preferences. The biorefineries
can offer a basic price and quantity contract to famers in order to contract for this total
amount. This will be the baseline pricing scenario to compare other types of contracts in
order to illuminate tradeoffs in efficiency and outcomes. These changes can be facilitated
by increasing the market price and decreasing input costs to get different supply
outcomes. These types of pricing options that focus on increasing outputs through
increases in prices fall under the domain of incentive based contracts. Specifically, in
these contracts farmers are encouraged to produce more by increasing the price per ton.
The second phase would assume that the biorefinery has a set quantity of stover
demanded and then determines how this quantity would be contracted through production
contracts. When assessing whether to incentivize specific management strategies, the
biorefinery may consider the higher costs derived from changing labor and management
activities, through differentiated contracts that address the additional risks of participation
(Paulson and Babcock, 2007, Tyndall, et al., 2011). This decision would involve the
possible tradeoffs between the size of fuel shed in terms of distance from the plant
(transportation costs) with the issues associated with contracting different management
regimes for sustainable supply of stover. The amount of stover available will be
determined by corn grain yields; the amount available to harvest will be determined by
management decisions.

Potentially, this pricing option can incentivize farmers to

practice specific types of conservation practices. These managements can include
changing tillage practices, implementing different conservation strategies, and increasing
the rate at which stover is harvested. Each of these strategies can be employed separately
or in congruence in order to increase the amount of stover produced per farm. Given the
cost-minimizing goals of the biorefineries, these production contracts would also need to
be cost effective and supply-driven management regimes.
The purpose of differentiating the market participants by management decisions
and their respective costs is such that the marketing chain operates as efficiently as
possible. Ideally, based on the results from the first chapter, the biorefinery would
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choose farmers within the supply shed that are in a continuous-corn rotation in close
proximity to the plant. Potentially, supplying from acres in continuous corn could be
accomplished at the $80 per ton of stover benchmark. However, tradeoffs within the
supply shed may prevent a single rotation type from being the most cost effective. These
tradeoffs include, but are not limited to, the land in any one rotation through time14,
regulatory

and

sustainability

constraints,

yield

constraints,

production

risks,

transportation and storage costs. Additionally, as stover is a secondary product to grain
production and there may be other factors preventing farmers from choosing a continuous
corn rotation. Thus, the gains from marketing stover may or may not be high enough to
change crop rotations.
Differentiated pricing and management strategies can consider the role of
environmental and regulatory issues that may change costs and practices at the farmlevel. Farmers surveyed in Iowa, indicated that the negative impacts on agronomic and
environmental quality would deter farmers from harvesting stover, along with potentially
unknown effects on yields (Tyndall, et al., 2011). Sustainability in this market means
that erosion rates remain under 5 tons/acre/year and soil organic matter is not being
depleted. These standards can be enforced through external regulation or internally by
farmer preference. Both potentially have the ability to increase the costs of procurement
and decrease the amount of stover by limiting the management choices available,
depending on several soil-level factors. However, given the heterogeneity of the soil
throughout the Corn Belt, in some cases, increasing conservation practices will allow for
more stover to be harvested. Given a region's expected endowment of stover, this analysis
will illuminate some of the potential advantages and disadvantages of different pricing
structures within the supply shed by incorporating environmental, agronomic and soil
characteristics, to meet or respond to these sustainability goals. The likely consequence of
such goals being that, either the price of stover would need to include the costs of

14

Corn rotates with soybeans and other crops, if the land contracted rotates out of corn, then no stover can
be harvested and more acres will need to be contracted.
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conservation or land and management strategies would be targeted such that
environmental abatement costs are minimized.
Additionally, in terms of comparing an incentive and production based
approaches with respect to the environmental outcomes, one may be more advantageous
than the other depending on location. National regulations and incentives at the
governmental level may be advantageous in setting standards, but can fail to capture the
spatially explicit differences in environmental outcomes resulting in inefficiencies that
can discourage innovation (Hirsch, 2001). Incentive based environmental pricing may be
more efficient than these national command and control or design standard approaches
(Antle, et al., 2003). Production based options may be more efficient in rotations or areas
where additional incentives are needed to offset the environmental degradation.
From the standpoint of market participation and cost competitiveness among
heterogeneous farms, the issue of environmental regulation and contracts may further
distort competitive forces. As environmental factors are tied to specific land parcels and
the costs of addressing these issues are not uniform, some farmers may have a spatial
market advantage (Vedder, 2001). Laffont (1995) describes these types of environmental
problems as moral hazard problems, where competition and cost minimization drive
farmer decisions towards taking on greater environmental risks while remaining
competitive with other market participants. In a highly competitive market, a lack of
bargaining power has the possibility of farmer neglecting or heavily discounting some of
the internalized costs of the non-marketed environmental services that the stover
provides. Parallels to the costs of environmental compliance may be seen in how the
costs of transportation are handled in a competitive market, whether by the sellers or the
buyers (Zhang and Sexton, 2001). In such a case, the uniformity of a supply-shed or
nationally based policy may be the most cost effective. Therefore, in terms of analysis, it
is important to consider the behavior of the market with and without sustainability
criteria.
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2.2. Methodology
2.2.1. Model Framework
Given the complexity of the decision making process for the biorefineries, the farmers
and the numerous tradeoffs that are considered, an optimization model is used to
illuminate the supply dynamics of this market and to calculate the prices needed for each
pricing option offered. This modeling effort includes the per acre analysis that was done
in Chapter 1, additionally including differentiated prices and transportation costs to
integrate the market. Considering the supply of stover, without assuming anything yet
about regulation, we theorize that the biofeedstock market for the biorefinery (principal),
would look like the following:

{

}̂

∑(

)

(16)

subject to

∑

̂

(17)

where
is price of stover harvested ($/ton)
is price of transportation from farm to plant ($/ton/mile)
is the distance from farm j to the plant (miles)
is the stover available from each farm (j) (tons/acre)
is the incentive bonus paid to the farmer for quantity increases ($/ton)
is the production bonus paid to the farmer for specific management practices, in terms
of increasing effort ($/acre)
̂ is the total stover needed for production
is the number of acres
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such that, the principal minimizes the expected cost of stover, subject to a minimum
amount of stover needed to run the plant. The decision making variables for the plant are
price and total quantity (̂), but the biorefinery could choose

, requiring a minimum

amount from any given supplier. The bonuses in this model relate to the incentive and
production based price schemes. In this analysis when incentive based pricing is
considered,

and vice versa for when production

based pricing is considered when

and prices remain stable. These

relationships are necessary, given that the effects on stover supply are interrelated with
the management practices and the output prices.
Additionally, the biorefinery is assumed to be responsible for the costs of
transportation. There is a possibility that farmers, especially those further from the
refinery may choose to undertake the costs of transportation as a means of securing the
agreement. Depending on the assumptions of the scope of the marketplace, the market
power of both the farmers and the refineries, the optimal transportation pricing may either
be freight-on-board (FOB) or uniform delivery (UD) (Zhang and Sexton, 2001). The
choice of transportation price will also be determined by bidding strategy from the
farmers, assuming that the biorefinery has no preferential farm type. We formalize this
assumption by noting that farmers will choose to harvest stover as long as they are
equally as well off as they would be without harvesting stover. Therefore, we assume that
the costs of transportation are covered by the refinery, either directly or as a monetary
transfer to the farmers.
The farmer’s simplified supply equation would look like,

{ }

((

)

)

and
{

}

(

)

(18)

(19)
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where
are stover production costs for each farm; these costs are functions on rotation,
tillage, removal, cover crop and barrier strip choices ($/ton)
is on farm storage costs, by month, times the number of months ($/ton)
is the amount of stover harvested; these costs are functions on rotation, tillage,
removal, cover crop and barrier strip choices(tons/acre)
is the number of acres within the soil type at location j
is a random parameter that changes supply available (e.g. weather)

In order to ensure that farmers are no worse off harvesting stover than not harvesting
stover, a participation constraint is used. The participation constraint would be,
((

)

)

(

)

(20)

Since the production of stover is a secondary product to other economic activity, the
participation constraint (P.C.) for the farmer to participate in the market would need to be
greater than

, which would be the farmers alternative income without harvesting

stover.
The variable

indicates that the cost of production is dependent on the total

harvested and what management regime is chosen at optimal. These costs are increasing
in output but not continuous, given that management choices are discrete. Farmers will
harvest stover up to the point that this marginal cost of producing stover will equal the
price being offered. For this exercise we assume that the amount of stover produced is an
expected yield multiplied by the acres in our representative farms. Expected yields are
calculated through an integrated wind and water erosion model, which is based on county
yields and soil types, and delineates output based on management regimes. We also
assume that for any given soil type the farmer will choose the same management type for
all the acres in that soil type and that these decisions are stable for the length of the
agreement.
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Equation (19) indicates that the optimal output for stover produced at any given
farm may not be the maximum stover available, even under expected conditions where
the randomness of outcomes,

is equal to zero. This randomness is important to

consider in the wider analysis as farmers are likely to contract based on acreage, given
the potential downside risks of contracting on quantities. Using expected yields limits the
analysis in this regard. The distribution of

depends on the variability of outcomes

through the landscape, some of which is random (e.g. rainfall) and some of which is
dependent on farmer effort (e.g. harvest rates, management practices). However, as the
empirical data is based on simulation the randomness in yields is simplified. The
biorefinery in response to the production risk may carry inventories or contract with more
acres. The biorefinery could potentially also contract based on location, as fluctuations in
transportation costs from the time the contract is signed to delivery may change the
effective cost of the stover; hence, the decision to separate storage and transportation
costs from the price of stover.
The dynamics of the farmer side of the problem have the following optimization
for the biorefinery, which can be populated with data and solved numerically,
{

}̂

∑(

[̂

)

]
(21)

[((
]

)
[{

)
}

(

)

]

where for every ton of stover the marginal revenue of stover less the cost of producing
stover is greater or equal to the utility of farmer j. For the moment we are simplifying the
market and ignoring effort on the farmer’s behalf, as well as any potential constraint due
to ensuring sustainability.
The difference in constraints will tell us if and by how much the biorefinery can
improve or alter the solution if the constraint was relaxed or if the biorefinery were to
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incentivize an element of the vector

to change the optimal solution. Therefore to

calculate the value of different management techniques, value of increasing distance
traveled etc. the shadow values are used to estimate what the additional cost would be to
incentivize these different decisions.
For example, the variable

is implicitly a function of different management

techniques and the value of changing output at any one farm would alter all of the
constraints,
(

)

[(

)

(

)]

(22)

=0
These options are weighed against the options of all the other farms in the fuel shed.
From this we can also see that if a farm is producing at maximum capacity,

is binding.

Any additional stover increases or decreases would need to either come from relaxing
the amount of stover demanded, or

,

, which would be in terms of the randomness in

actual output. However, if a farm is not at maximum capacity, then the differences in
production costs in

could be useful in planning at the biorefinery, assuming

that these costs to incentivize higher production could be revealed. When constructing the
menu of pricing incentives that the biorefinery would offer, it is important to consider
how changing one aspect of the pricing or quantities would change the behavior of the
farms above the simplest price offer.
Solving the system of equations for the price of stover, indicates several important
considerations,
(

)

(23)

This is the minimum price that farmers would be willing to accept in order to harvest
stover. Tradeoffs could potentially be seen between the production and incentive based
bonuses, if a producer could choose between the two options. We assume that the
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refinery is going to either choose to reward bonuses based on incentives or on production
but unlikely both. For farmers to be indifferent between the production and incentive
based pricing, the change of one unit in

based on management would need to equal the

incremental change in output. This will hold true in our model, as management choices
and outputs are discrete choices. However, changing a combination of managements may
also result in the same output in a continuous system. For example, if the farmer added
cover crops to a reduced tillage practice, they could get potentially the same outcome by
choosing no-till and a different harvest rate. Additionally, if the incentive based on
management practice only has a high impact on some soil types, it may not be as efficient
at increasing output as an output based bonus.
While the analytical tradeoffs are useful in highlighting the complex choices of
changing price, management and quantity parameters, they can be too general to
illuminate the localized constraints of the fuel sheds. Therefore a numerical approach is
used within the optimization structure outlined in Equation (21) to highlight how these
different pricing schemes can be applied in a more practical manner. Additionally, the
different approaches in terms of production versus incentive based pricing may be more
efficient by region.
2.2.2. Alternative Pricing Structures
The corn stover market can be based on acreage or volume and can specify the price,
bonuses, timing, and management practices. The formation of the base price of stover is
going to start at the minimum costs of producing and harvesting. The base price for the
farmer would include, just the price of stover and the output,

{

}

(24)

This type of pricing option would assume that the seller market was competitive, and that
farmers would produce where their marginal costs equal the price, and then contract
based on the acreage or tonnage produced. The biorefinery could choose to fix prices,
acreage or harvest rates, and leave the remaining to be chosen by the farmers. Although,
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we have assumed that outputs are based on expected yields, and farmers are risk neutral,
if these assumptions are relaxed, then farmers may see additional revenue risks with
fluctuations in yields and higher outputs agreed upon. Depending on the menu of options
available, farmers may choose to underestimate their total amount by a percentage or
increase the number of acres agreed upon. This would allow for lower amounts to be
harvested on a per acre basis in the case of downside production risks.
The base price can be adjusted for the entire supply shed, or for groups and
individual farmers, through the use of a menu of price options that offer bonuses related
to output.

{

}

(25)

These are incentive based pricing strategies where, the bonus increases the farmgate price
for some farmers, but it is not tied to any specific management. These types of pricing
options would be useful for the biorefinery to consider if they wanted to motivate farmers
closer to the plant to produce more. The downside may occur when considering the
environmental costs of producing stover, in that as harvest rates increase for some
rotations, it decreases sustainability without offsetting conservation practices.
Alternatively, it may be too costly for the biorefinery for each farmer to produce
the maximum stover per acre, given the costs of changing production managements, so
the biorefinery may want to choose the management that is going to get the highest bang
for their buck. Additionally, given that the actual production of stover may not equal the
expected amount of stover, then it may be more efficient to incentivize farmers based on
management with the probability of higher outcomes. These are typically called
production contracts and specify the inputs and managements. The pricing strategy would
look like the following, where Mg represents the vector of managements that produce

,
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{

(

)

(

)

}

(26)

These yield or total quantity bonuses have the potential to segment the market by the
efficiencies of the farmers, as the bonuses are tied to a specific management. This could
cover, incentivizing farmers to switch rotations, increase cover crop usage, increase
harvest rates, etc. The bonus is based on a management regime, such as implementing
the use of a cover crop, which indirectly increases the amount of stover that can be
harvested. As such, the units on this bonus are in dollars per acre and not dollars per ton.
2.2.3. Assumptions
In order for the biorefinery to know whether or not it should incentivize a specific
management practice to increase production, then it is useful to know what management
practices would be used in the absence of these bonuses. This is useful information in
several ways, namely, knowing which management strategies are productive on which
acres of land, what the environmental outcomes will be and how to better incentivize
both the productive and environmental resources inherent in these regional markets. The
biorefineries could ask for this information, observe this information or could estimate
which practices are likely to produce what levels of output. In order to answer this
question we start with the following assumptions about the pricing schemes and data:
Pricing


We assume that the biorefinery offers a menu of take-it-or-leave-it options
as a simplification of the modeling structure and as a result of the
endowments of stover at other farms, which would assumedly decrease
the bargaining power of the farmer. Only in the cases where the
constraints are binding would farmers be able to negotiate.



We also assume that there are no informational transaction costs in this
market.
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We make the simplifying assumption that the decision making process and
the reservation utility for the farmers is the profit that farmers gain from
crops without harvesting stover, since stover is a secondary product to the
production of corn grain.



Additionally, we assume that both principal and the agents are risk
neutral, as a means to simplify the complex nature of the problem. In
dealing with production risk, we assume that the biorefinery will likely
adjust stocks from year to year. Assuming heterogeneity of farmers in the
supply shed makes accounting for risk difficult, as if one farmer is
unwilling to participate, then the biorefinery could either increase price or
search for another farm.

Assuming risk neutrality also means that the costs of sustainability are
internalized. However, our assumption that farmers and biorefineries are risk
neutral may not hold true in reality. Farmers may see harvesting stover as a longterm risk to productivity or environmental stewardship and may decrease the
quantities available or not participate in the market as a result of either higher
reservation values or if environmental concerns are coupled with risk, increasing
the price that biorefineries would have to offer in order to get acceptance. In
addition, farmers are likely to comply with environmental regulation as eligibility
for some federal programs is determined by meeting these environmental
standards, though we start our analysis with this assumption of compliance
relaxed.
Data


One of the limiting factors that need to be considered is the current
rotations of farm land in the supply shed. The only management choice
that does not change in this analysis is the crop rotation, as we assumed
that these are fixed at the 2010-12 rotations.
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For this exercise, we are assuming that these rotations are stable for the
length of the agreements.



To parcel out farms, the areas of the rotations were overlaid with the
counties (yield estimates) and soil types (integrated model results) and
distance (in 25 mile increments), such that all of the soil type X, in
rotation Y, Z miles from the plant would make the same decision.15One
assumption that is inherent in these calculations is that for soil types that
correspond with these rotations, distances and harvest rates, the
biorefinery would be able to negotiate for all of that soil type.

Crop rotation choices may have to do with factors, like global crop, fertilizer and
energy prices, which are beyond the scope of this problem. Limiting the ability for
farmers to alter their rotations also limits the analysis to the lower bound of supply
response.
2.2.4. Data
Through management practices of the farm, a farmer can choose strategies that
benefit both the environment and their profit margins through the removal of stover and
application of conservation practices. Accounting for the spatial heterogeneity of soil
dynamics and erosion is accomplished using an integrated model which combines the
Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE2) and the Wind Erosion Equation
(WEPS). These models are coupled with databases that contain relevant climate, soils,
management weights, yields and location specific properties. The management options
used for this economic analysis can be found in Table 2-1. Changes in supply density
and environmental outcomes can separately or simultaneously be affected by these
different management regimes.

15

This is of course a rough approximation to what actual farms would do, considering that farms have
several different types of soil within a field but can manage stover collection using precision technologies
based on these soil results.
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Table 2-1: Regimes for the Integrated RUSLE2/WEPS Model
Crop
Rotation
Cover Crop
Regime
Tillage
Regime
Residue
Removal
Regime
Barrier
Regime

CG
SB
NCC
100rye
40rye, 60clover
60rye, 40radish
RT
NT
NRH
MRH
MHH
HRH
NVB
SVB

Corn grain
Soybeans
No cover crop
100% Rye winter cover
40% Rye winter cover, 60% Clover winter cover
60% Rye winter cover, 40% Oilseed Radish winter cover
Reduced Tillage: Chisel Plow, Disk tandem light finishing
No Tillage: Minimum possible disturbance
No Residue Harvest
Moderate Residue Harvest: Approximately 35%
Moderately High Residue Harvest: Approximately 50%
High Residue Harvest: Approximately 80%
No vegetative barrier
Strip vegetative barrier: modeled as cool season grass 3m
wide in middle of slope

Note: For each crop management zone and soil type, each permutation of the above regime was used in the
model.

These scenarios represent the most likely cropping and management decisions for
the Corn Belt. Given the diversity in landscape of the region, the results from the
integrated model were related back to geographic locations based on SURGO soil type16.
The Cropland Data Layer for 2010 to 2012 was used to calculate acres in the three
different rotations (Continuous Corn, Corn-Soybean and Corn-Corn Soybean). These
rotations were overlaid with the SURGO soil type polygons (Figure 2-1).
Yields for corn grain were based on POLYSIS estimates at the county level.
These were not included in the original dataset and therefore are backed out from the
total biomass harvested in the first year, based on the percentages of removal and then
divided by 56 to convert the amounts into bushels per acre. Yield drag estimates were
then subtracted from these estimates. The scenarios were undertaken based on soil type,
under the assumption that farmers will choose management practices to the dominant soil

16

The data for these layers can be found the NRCS Soil data mart (SURGO,
http://soildatamart.nrcs.usda.gov/), Geospatial gateway (Elevation and Cropland Data Layer,
http://datagateway.nrcs.usda.gov/) and the Indiana Department of Agriculture (tillage practices,
http://www.in.gov/isda/files/2011_Poster.pdf).
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conditions of their farm for a three-year period. These choices are limited by their
respective effects on the t-factor, or overall erosion calculated within the model. Erosion
rates above the prescribed t-factor occur when adding the removal of stover beyond these
management practices. Based on the data from RUSLE2/WEPS we assigned rotations, in
order to not allow the optimization model to switch rotations mid-period, the values were
discounted to the present. We surmise that the farmer can choose cover crop regime,
tillage regime, residual removal regime, yield regime and vegetative barrier regime
(Table 2-1). The combinations of these six decisions enumerate 576 different options for
each of our farms.

.
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Figure 2-1. Corn and Soybean Crop Rotations for the Years 2010-2012 Using the Crop Land Data Layer
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Table 2-2: Cost Estimates For the Model
Item
Corn17
Soybeans
Stover18 - includes wrap ($5.6), fuel (2.66), labor($2.88),
equip ($6.42) and storage ($16.47)
Cover crops
100% Rye
40/60 Rye-Clover mix
60/40 Rye-Radish
Nutrients
Nitrogen
Phosphorus
Potassium
Vegetative barrier
Machinery Costs by Rotation and tillage19
No-till
Continuous corn (CG)
Corn in Rotation
Soybeans in Rotation
Reduced Tillage
Continuous corn (CG)
Corn in Rotation
Soybeans in Rotation
Misc. Costs (seed, pesticides, hauling, drying, etc.)20
Continuous Corn yields less than 122 Bu/ac
Continuous Corn yields greater than 184 Bu/ac
Continuous Corn yields between 122 and 184 bu/ac
Corn in Rotation, yields less than 130 Bu/ac
Corn in Rotation, yields greater than 193 Bu/ac
Corn in Rotation, yields between 130 and 193 Bu/ac
Soybeans in Rotation

17

Unit
$/ Bushel
$/ Bushel

Value
$
7.00
$ 12.00

$/ ton

$

34.03

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$

31.69
36.61
30.41

$/ lb.
$/ lb.
$/ lb.
$/acre

$
0.54
$
0.74
$
0.57
$ 100.00

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$

78.80
65.06
65.35

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$

78.80
68.41
74.67

$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre
$/acre

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

256.00
294.00
289.00
252.00
285.00
282.00
150.00

These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A. Miller, B. Nielsen, T. J. Vyn, S. Casteel, B. Johnson, K.Wise,
and B. Erickson. (2012) 2012 Purdue Crop Cost & Return Guide, Purdue Extension..
18
These costs are based on Thompson, J.L., and W.E. Tyner. "Corn Stover for Bioenergy Production: Cost
Estimates and Farmer Supply Response.", ibid.
19
These costs are based on Duffy, M. (2012) Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa - 2012. Iowa
State University Extension.
20
These costs are based on Dobbins, C., A. Miller, B. Nielsen, T. J. Vyn, S. Casteel, B. Johnson,
K.Wise, and B.Erickson. Purdue Crop Cost & Return Guide. Purdue Extension. ID-166-W.(2012)
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Since one aspect of this modeling effort is to illuminate the advantages and
disadvantages of managing the supply shed with respect to regional soil and
environmental characteristics, two diverse supply sheds where chosen. Figure 2-2 and
Figure 2-3 show the two locations and the availability of corn acres by distance from the
plant and crop rotation. These figures are based on two pre-existing biorefineries, in
order to assume away other location based decisions, like access to end-markets and
natural gas markets. There are multiple locations in which a biorefinery could establish a
plant, and these two locations were chosen to highlight the tradeoffs in regions where
conditions are favorable and average.


The first location was chosen as it had the largest amount of acreage in continuous
corn for the 2010-12 rotations within a 50 to 100 mile radius of the existing
Archers Daniel Midland plant in Clinton, IA. Additionally, it is an area that has
the potential to have high erosion rates.



The second location is based on the Emmetsburg, Iowa Poet plant, uses corn cobs
and crop residues as a bioenergy feedstocks.

These plants will enable us to compare and contrast the efficiencies that could be gained
from the different market, regulatory and price based incentive structures. These
efficiencies will be more pronounced given the starting rotations, yields and soil based
outcomes that the fuel sheds are endowed with. The low stover prices provide a starting
point for what additional incentives would be needed to change management strategies
and increase outputs. Nutrients were considered separately, given the correlation with
grain yields.
As the mathematical model evaluates the distance, production levels and costs for
each farm with all other farms, as a simplification, farms with their centroids within 25
mile bands were aggregated based on county, soil type and rotation. This decreased the
number of permutations that the model had to calculate to just about a million
observations for each refinery (each farm has 576 different management options, there
are approximately, 3225 different soil types within the first 50 miles of the first plant
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and40 different soil types within 60 miles of the second plant). Each soil type can have
up to 3 different rotations and can be located in different counties, which changes the
yield estimates. To calculate the distance from the biorefinery to the representative farms
we used the center of each polygon and then measured the distance in miles as the crow
flies. Transportation costs are covered by the biorefinery at a cost of $16.69 per ton
($0.35 per ton/mile)(Thompson and Tyner, 2011).

Figure 2-2. Supply Area for Representative Plant 1
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Figure 2-3. Supply Area for Representative Plant 2

To illustrate the complexity of balancing supply availability, incentivizing
management practices and distance in these representative areas, Figure 2-4 shows the
tons of biomass that can be harvested within a 25 mile radius of the Representative Plant
2, given the acres by soil type and management options. The farms will optimize their
management decisions based on the price of stover and marginal cost and the most cost
efficient will participate in the stover market. The advantage of changing the incentive
structure based on management for select types of farmers is assumed to be that the
biorefinery could reduce the number of acres, and thus transaction costs, which would
need to be contracted. Increasing incentives will increase the supply by any single farm,
until the farm reaches the maximum supply amount, or until it becomes too costly.
Alternatively, given the heterogeneous nature of the farms, the response to different
incentives will not produce a uniform change in outputs. This hypothesis will be tested in
the following sections.
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Figure 2-4. Supply Options for Representative Plant 2, Within 25 Miles

One important caveat to the analysis is that the distribution of output over the surface J is
not uniform and will change over time. There may be some areas in which the biorefinery
would choose to restrict participation, for example, with transportation costs limiting the
market or if there are sustainability criteria to be met. The distribution of yield outcomes
will likely not be known fully when these agreements are signed nor when the biorefinery
is planned. The downside risk of low yields, the potentially high costs of under supply
and heterogeneous nature of farms may make ranking farms inefficient.

As such an

increase (decrease) in types will amount to the cost of procuring the stover and the
distribution of the stover throughout the region.
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2.3. Base Pricing
Assuming that total stover demanded is fixed, and the biorefinery is looking to find the
outcomes of the initial option of {

}, by optimizing Equation (21) with the

numerical data for the representative biorefineries, assuming that both bonuses are 0. The
biorefinery can set the price and acreage targets. Looking at these issues individually, we
can get an approximate number of acres that would need to be contracted and a cost of
procuring the stover. In the case of setting the stover price at the breakeven cost for the
market, we can identify the most efficient farms and soil types.

In order to gauge

where in the market additional efficiencies can be gained, the starting price for a ton of
stover is set at $34.03. This price covers wrap ($5.6), fuel (2.66), labor ($2.88), equip
($6.42) and storage ($16.47) specifically related to stover harvesting, and is expected to
be consistent throughout the landscape. Since nutrient replacement is an important
consideration of cost for harvesting stover, these costs are considered separately to the
base price. In addition, it indicates areas that may have higher costs based on the
heterogeneous grain and stover yields throughout the landscape. In reality, these costs are
considered simultaneously and farmers base their nutrient decisions at the farm, not acre
level. Solving for the lowest price possible to meet the 571,000 tons of demand, the first
biorefinery could set their prices at $95.05 per ton, and for the second biorefinery the
lowest market clearing price was $89.52 per ton.
At these results in acreage for the respective biorefineries, 250,413 acres were
participating in the market from 305 different soil types for Biorefinery 1, and 291,539
acres from 186 soil types were participating for Biorefinery 2.The differences in the
prices between these two supply sheds are a result of the differences in expected yields
and the difference in the marginal costs (Table 2-3).
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Table 2-3: Cost and Environmental Metrics Base Pricing
Cost for Stover (Million $)
Price ($/ton)
Total Costs for Transportation (Million $)
Total Acres
Tons of Displaced Soil
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

Biorefinery 1
$54.27
$95.05
$21.73
250,413
695,692
20%

Biorefinery 2
$51.115
$89.52
$19.876
291,539
698,415
15%

Due in part to the composition of rotations, soil types and managements, 15 to 20% of the
land in these fuel sheds are over the 5 tons/acre erosion metric and negatively impacting
their soil organic matter.
As it is useful to see what the optimal management strategies are without the use
of bonuses or incentives, the breakdown of management strategies by percentage of
acreage at this price can be found in Table 2-4. These management choices are the result
of the farms equating marginal cost with the price of stover. The marketplace takes into
account the differences in costs and available land by management strategy and chooses
the least cost option for the biorefinery. We will consider this the baseline estimates for
the market and would be the closest to a market based solution for these fuel sheds. It
also gives us a set of metrics to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of other pricing
strategies.
One result of the low price is that not all of these farms are harvesting at the
highest possible output. There are several strategies that the biorefinery may employ in
regards to making this market efficient. Biorefineries may desire farms that are producing
at their maximum output available in order to decrease transportation and transaction
costs. For example, both biorefineries could provide incentives for a higher percentage
of their acres contracted to harvest at the high harvest rates. To balance harvesting with
conservation, more acreage could be incentivized to use a cover crop or a barrier strip to
keep erosion rates low and soil organic matter positive. These conservation measures for
continuous corn and for a corn-corn-bean rotation will also allow for more stover to be
harvested. These types of incentives would be covered in production pricing schemes,
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where the biorefinery would pay for the farmer to use a specific management regime.
Alternatively, the biorefineries could choose to increase the price based on output,
through incentive based pricing, and allow the farmers to choose the management
strategy that would benefit their farm the greatest.
Table 2-4: Management in the Baseline at lowest price
Biorefinery 1
Total Acres
250,413
Management Regimes (as a % of total acres
Rotation
Continuous Corn
34.6%
Corn- Soybean
32.4%
Corn-Corn Soybean
33%
Cover Crops
100rye
38.2%
40rye, 60clover
27.1%
60rye, 40radish
17.5%
NCC
17.2%
Tillage
No-till
47.76%
Reduced till
52.24%
Harvest Rates
High
47.58%
Medium High
44.68%
Medium
7.56%
Vegetative Barrier
No Barrier
48.6%
Some Vegetative Barrier
51.4%
Distance
25 miles
9.1%
50 miles
44.5%
75 miles
46.4%

Biorefinery 2
291,539

15.6%
58.3%
26.1%
23.25%
32.85%
24.1%
19.8%
59.3%
40.7%
39.4%
58.4%
2.2%
47%
53%
19.8%
48.4%
31.8%

2.3.1. Uncertainty in Supply
Given the risks to production in terms of weather, maximizing output per farm may not
be the most practical outcome. If in our analysis

, results in lower than expected

output, then farmers producing at their maximum could face penalties for under
harvesting; if the shock is widespread, then the shortage could result in the plant
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substantially reducing production. The biorefinery could choose to focus on acreage, and
then the quantity of acres would be fixed and these fluctuations in output per acre would
be equally as important. The problem for the biorefinery is three dimensional, where the
refinery could travel further, agree to more per acre (through increasing prices or
incentivizing managements) or choose more acres.
In terms of the base pricing, for the first phase of the biorefinery’s decision
making process, there are three factors to consider, the total stover demanded, the price
offered and the output per farm. The design of the price scheme would then need to
account for different price-quantity-acre scenarios, where these factors are either variable
or fixed. Changing the total stover demanded shifts the production risk from the farms to
the biorefinery. The biorefinery has three options – undersupply, capacity and over
̂

supply,(

) - for contracting the amounts that are required to supply production at

the refinery. If there is a negative shock in the supply shed then the biorefinery would
need to find additional stover at the time of harvest to make up the difference. In such a
case, there would be no provision for what management strategies would be most
efficient, as stover would be harvested as available. Farmers would also be able to
negotiate for higher prices, and limits on sustainability may still apply.
In general, the biorefinery may choose to weigh the distribution of output with
costs of transportation. Since the concern is over the supply, ̂ , the shadow cost of
relaxing this constraint is
(

, which when solved by substitution of Equation (22)
)

[(

)

(

)]

(27)

where the costs of additional (less) tons of stover demanded depends on the price, the
cost of storage, transportation costs and the marginal costs of producing any additional
ton of stover. Incorporating the potential randomness of outcomes due to weather occurs
with the constraint on actual versus predicted outcomes of

through

. Farmers will

produce the amount of stover such that it meets their participation constraint and no more
and makes no explicit concession for the environmental outcomes. This assumes that any
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additional stover will come from an additional farmer within the range of j when [

].

As concerning fluctuations in price or quantity, this also contends that for the biorefinery,
changing the total stover demanded to or , will depend on the probability of the stover
being available in the region, based on the

constraint. When the production risk is

taken on by the farmer, the shadow value of

becomes the penalty of over- or

undersupply. If the production risk is taken on by the biorefinery, then Equation (27), is
no longer binding, and the refinery can choose either to incentivize a higher level of
effort or choose more acreage.
Given the limited geographic area, if one farm experiences a shock, it is likely
that farms nearby will also experience the same shock. We assume a 5% and 10%
increase and decrease in supply available for both firms to illustrate how prices, acreage
and managements would need to change in order to cope with these shocks (Table 2-5). If
the shock is positive, then there may be more stover per acre, but operational costs may
increase slightly as management choices shift to harvest more. If the shock is negative,
and the farm is not producing at its highest level of output, then prices would also have to
increase to harvest more from those farms.
If these changes in supply occur after the acres are agreed upon, then to meet a
5% decrease in supply, prices would have to increase for Biorefinery 1 by a minimum
of$0.20 and $0.43 to encourage more harvesting of stover. For Biorefinery 2, the prices
for an increase in supply would remain the same. Essentially, this amounts to no change
in price in this case. For a decrease in supply, the prices would have to increase by a
minimum of $1.02 and $3.96 to meet the 571,000 tons needed by the plant. The
difference in prices between the biorefineries is due in part to the differences in rotations
and yields in these two locations. For the second biorefinery, the change in supply
coupled with higher prices means that most of the acreage already contracted must
intensify production.
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Table 2-5: Acreage Changes in Response to Supply Changes
Firm

Biorefinery 1

Biorefinery 2

Rotation

Baseline
(acres)

Total
Price
CG
CG,CG,SB
CG,SB
Total
Price
CG
CG,CG,SB
CG,SB

250,414
$95.05
86,734
82,729
80,951
291,539
$87.15
45,567
75,928
170,043

5%
Increase
(acres)
150,479
$94.85
89,247
47,666
13,567
265,165
$87.15
52,335
54,350
158,481

10%
Increase
(acres)
148,227
$94.68
95,645
52,582
291,020
$87.15
77,538
115,363
98,117

10%
Decrease
(acres)
175,450
$95.48
101,611
60,273
13,567
279,074
$91.13
12,301
19,786
246,986

5%
Decrease
(acres)
163,130
$95.25
107,880
41,683
13,568
291,175
$88.17
76,283
106,592
108,299

This comes as a result that marginally increasing production on some acres may be more
efficient than increasing the numbers of acres that need to be contracted, given the
complex tradeoffs between management and outputs for different soil types. For the first
refinery, the supply is more flexible to increases and decreases in supply. In some cases,
the plant may choose acreage and management strategies based on the ability to fluctuate
with prices and quantities.
The changes in acreage will also correspond to changes in management practices.
These changes can be found in Figure 2-5 for Biorefinery 1 and Figure 2-6 for
Biorefinery 2. For the 10% increase in stover demanded, more acres are using cover
crops, harvest rates increase, and other conservation management strategies are practiced
for Biorefinery 1. The story is similar for Biorefinery 2, as increased demand leads to
more intense harvesting, and the offsets from other conservation practices are beneficial.
One potential conclusion of this is that as the demand in the marketplace changes, the
effects on soil resources may not be as great, as the effects are lower per acre but more
widespread.
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Figure 2-5: Management Choices for Different Demand Scenarios for Biorefinery 1 (Acres)
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Figure 2-6: Management Choices for Different Demand Scenarios for Biorefinery 2 (Acres)
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To analytically answer why there would be an intensification in supply on some
acres we can look at the optimal decision making process on . When considering
Equation (27), we can generate what the value of changing management or traveling
further is worth to the biorefinery,
(

)

[(

)

(

)]

(28)

The focus of this section is to illuminate the tradeoffs of price versus distance. Therefore
we will temporarily assume that

are identical and are operating where

marginal cost equals price and both

and

can be ignored. Considering heterogeneous

farmers, crop rotations, yields, harvest rates, contract acceptance - the distribution will be
lumpy through space.
2.4. Incentive Pricing
The alternative to setting the price and total quantity as in the previous section is to allow
the price of stover to adjust such that the biorefinery can incentivize individual or groups
of farms to produce higher amounts. The structure of this pricing scheme would
be {

}, where the biorefinery does not require farms to practice any

specific management, but there are incentives for higher quantities produced. We can
either assume that these bonuses are individual, groups, or that they are the same for the
region, essentially resulting in a higher base stover price. Since we assume that soil type,
location and rotation are fixed, we will delineate farmers by these characteristics.
Without assuming identical farms, if the biorefineries were to choose their supply
chain based on rotation, the tradeoff for the biorefineries would be in terms of the number
of farms that would need to be contracted and the rate of harvest that would be required
to meet supply (Figure 2-4). For Biorefinery 1, it is possible to contract solely with the
same corn acreage as in the market baseline; however, these farms would need to
intensify production, at higher costs to meet the biorefineries demands. When considering
either of the soybean rotation options to meet the demanded additional acreage and
intensification of harvest needed to occur to meet supply goals. Unlike the first
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Biorefinery, Biorefinery 2, would not be able to single-source a specific rotation given
the current conditions.
In the case of these two refineries, the first refinery chooses to contract with
acreage farther away from the refinery as there are potentially more efficient farms at a
further distance. The alternative hypothesis is that the biorefineries could incentivize the
size-management-rotation combination of these efficient farms, closer to the biorefinery
if rotations were not fixed and the price was high enough to incentivize a switch. From
the first chapter we assume that the most efficient rotation is continuous corn, no till,
100% rye cover and no vegetative barrier. If we still assume that rotations are fixed, then
the price and environmental metrics for differentiating prices by rotation and distance can
be found in Table 2-6 and Table 2-7.
Table 2-6: Cost and Environmental Metrics by Rotation
Cost for Stover (Million $)
Price ($/ton)
Continuous Corn
Corn- Corn- Soybean
Corn – Soybean
Costs for Transportation (Million $)
Total Acres
Tons of Displaced Soil
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

Biorefinery 1
$50.83

Biorefinery 2
$50.13

$86.78
$88.92
$95.05
$23.487
247,128
644,358
12%

$ 85.87
$ 89.39
$ 87.95
$18.88
304,990
731,525
9%

Table 2-7: Cost and Environmental Metrics for Contracting within 25 miles
Cost for Stover (Million $)
Price ($/ton)
25 miles
50 miles
75 miles
Costs for Transportation (Million $)
Total Acres
Tons of Displaced Soil
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

Biorefinery 1
$50.54

Biorefinery 2
$ 49.43

$87.97
$89.17
$95.05
$23.51
248,263
644,358
12%

86.25
86.52
86.93
$19.24
239,249
855,320
15%
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If the biorefinery moves to bonuses based on soil type and output, the largest that
the biorefinery 1 would need to pay out would be $61.01 and the smallest would be
$50.79 per ton. These bonuses added to the base price would set the market clearing price
of stover between $82.82 and 93.04 per ton, making certain soil types more attractive
from a cost-minimization stand point. For biorefinery 2, the individual bonuses would be
between $47.92 and $53.12per ton. For the biorefinery 2, the effective price of stover
would be between $79.95 and $85.15 per ton. A move towards contracting with more
acres in continuous corn and incentivizing the most productive soil types would indicate
that it may be cheaper to harvest stover from these types. However, to meet the total
demand by the biorefinery, acreage in other rotations and distances may be required.
Using incentive pricing based on fixed types has the potential to save the refineries from
$0.988 to $1.7 million in feedstock costs. Savings also occur in transportation costs for
both the distance and rotation based contracting, such that the biorefineries could
potentially save$0.64 to $1.7 million, depending on where acres are contracted.
One important caveat to this, that although it may make sense for the biorefinery
to discriminate prices based on rotation from a cost standpoint it may not incentivize
farmers to move towards continuous corn. And for farmers to be indifferent between the
contracts for the different rotations, the cost of switching rotations, plus the price
difference between the two contracts would need to be considered. These savings could
be amplified if the assumption of fixed rotations were relaxed. Though the costs of
switching rotations would need to be borne out through other market mechanisms, or be
small enough such that the difference of changing rotations in not greater than the
difference in prices between the different rotation.
One important concern is that in the absence of environmental regulation, any
increase in stover price can increase the erosion rates beyond what is sustainable. For the
base contract, for the first biorefinery 50,082 acres were above the 5 tons of soil/acre
metric and were negatively impacting soil organic matter. However, with the contracts
considered, the percentage of acreage unsustainably harvested either remained the same
or decreased both in absolute terms and relative to the change in acreage contracted.
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Intensifying the harvest outputs and bringing supply to the 25 mile radius for the first
biorefinery decreased the number of unsustainable acres to 4,479. This adjustment is
attributed to more acres using cover crops as a means to increase harvesting. For the
second biorefinery, 29,831 acres were over the sustainability metric or 10% of the total
acreage, resulting in 275,337 tons of soil being displaced. With the intensification of
biomass harvested for the second refinery, 53,016 acres were over the sustainability
metric, with a 10% increase in soil displacement.
2.5. Production Based Pricing
The biorefinery may choose to offer bonuses or require farmers to practice certain
management practices. In doing so, the biorefinery chooses to decrease the variability in
the market place with the goal of a stable supply in return for slightly higher costs.
Approximating these costs can be accomplished through estimating either the difference
from the optimal behavior or in some cases through estimating the average differences
between employing the practice or not. The estimates for the biorefineries will be much
less than estimates found in Chapter 1, given the regional differences of these
biorefineries. In addition, the marginal costs and benefits for farmers are going to be
driven by soil types and yields. The more homogenous the supply region, the smaller will
be the difference among practices
In order to illuminate the tradeoffs of incentivizing management practices, we will
now explicitly assume that the inputs to

and

are explicit.Maximizing the

biorefinery’s decision making based on individual farm output would look like the
following, where Mg represents the vector of managements that produce
(

)

,

[(
(29)

)

(

)

]

[

]=0

In the case of the over or undersupply of stover, there are some management strategies
that are worth more to the farmer or worth more to the biorefinery. These shadow prices
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for management practices will change based on location and the constraints on the
density of supply. And again are linearized around the optimal solution for the
biorefinery indicated in the previous sections. The interpretation on the sign of these
management practices indicate that prices would need to increase (decrease) by the value,
in order for that management practice to be incentivized for the region. These do not
measure the differences in individual contracts, but the average overall for the fuel shed,
because prices offered to individual farmers may be known widely.
These price changes by acre can be found in Table 2-8. The base price per ton
changes as different management practices are encouraged or penalized. The prices by
management that are negative would decrease the amount of stover available to harvest
and would result in a lower per acre profit. The biorefineries may choose to discount or
penalize acres using these practices. Penalties would happen in this scenario, in part
because both the biorefineries and the farms are considered risk neutral.
The refinery may also choose to only harvest with specific management
practices, though homogenization of practices through the landscape may not be the
ultimate goal. For example, if the biorefinery would only incentivize acres harvesting at a
high harvest rate, the incentive based bonus per acre would start at $20.49 and then
increase incrementally with each ton of stover harvested. The total amount per farm
could still change based on the other management choices that are available to choose
from. Meaning, if the biorefinery sets the price and then offers a premium for higher
harvest rates per acre, then the farm would then choose a management choice (tillage,
cover, and barrier) to optimize under given high harvest rates.
Based on this we can see that the optimal management strategies for the first
biorefinery are much more robust than those for the second biorefinery. The premiums
for the second refinery are in high harvest rates and the use of 100% rye cover crops.
Other options did not warrant a change in price, as the refinery was indifferent between
other cover crops or harvest rates. As far as overall costs of procuring stover,
incentivizing management practices and decreasing overall prices may be in the
biorefinery 1, best interest from a cost perspective, except in the case of incentivizing
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cover crops. For the second biorefinery, the base costs increase but the amount spent
overall is lower.
From an environmental standpoint, the outcomes for sustainability are a mixed
bag. In some of the management regimes, production pricing result in a lower percentage
of acreage harvesting unsustainability. In the case of increasing harvest rates, for the first
biorefinery this means that more cover crops and conservation practices are being used.
For the second biorefinery, incentivizing cover crops directly decreases the impact of
harvesting stover on soil erosion and organic matter. These prices are still not explicitly
considering the costs that come from regulating the market for sustainability.
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Table 2-8: Bonuses by Management

Tillage
44.01
77.58

Cost for Stover (Million $)
Base Price ($/ton)
Management Bonus ($ per acre)
(10.45)
Reduced Tillage
6.93
No tillage
High Harvest
Medium High Harvest
Medium Harvest
100% Rye Harvest
40% rye, 60% clover
60% rye, 40% radish
No Vegetative Barrier
Vegetative Barrier
Costs for Transportation (Million $ ) 24.113
Total Acres
262,703
Tons of Displaced Soil
673,878
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

12%

Biorefinery 1
Removal Cover
44.45
60.32
75.21
77.10

Barrier
49.96
76.63

Tillage
50.12
90.19

Biorefinery 2
Removal
Cover
52.66
52.481
90.19
86.96

Barrier
50.235
86.96

(5.23)
20.49
(23.60)
64.08

4.27

16.62
126.19
141.23

21.517
215,836
432,359
8%

4.27

25.69
21.98
24.089 22.077
265,060 261,350
721,613 725,478
16%

20%

(5.23)
18.382
263,242
881,826

20.975
271,504
723,108

28%

10%

20.975 18.382
271,504 263,242
723,108 881,826
10%

28%
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2.6. Environmental Regulation
Sustainability may be an underlying requirement of this market functioning.
Establishing the mechanism for the biorefineries to restrict biomass collected from
certain types of farmers, leads us into the effects that other external policies may have on
the distribution and size of the market. Addressing the regulation aspects of this market,
through enforcing erosion standards than an additional constraint would needed to be
added, and the environmental inputs of stover would need to be implicit or indicated as
with each respective constraint,
( )

̅

(30)

We assume that this constraint is external to the market; however, the costs of
compliance are either borne by the farmer, altering the marginal costs of participating or
by the biorefinery, altering the costs of procurement. As such that the soil erosion losses
are less than the standard put forth by the regulator, where ̅ in the current case is 5
tons/acre. Regulation can also be done in terms of a tax or subsidy, which can change the
effective price of stover or the price of inputs in harvesting stover (e.g. cover crops or
barrier strips). For some farmers, constraints on sustainability would be considered
significant enough to be a barrier to entry as they would no longer be better off than not
harvesting stover.
Other methods of regulation discussed involved targeting specific areas for
conservation practices. If regulation instead of setting ̅ , constrains stover harvest to
land, that is not classified as highly erodible, than the feasible supply areas would change
and thus changing the distribution of supply though the region. In addition, adding in the
environmental constraint has the potential to change the threshold price that farmers will
produce at by externalizing the costs of erosion control, as the production costs of
production would need to be covered by pstover. However, from the first Chapter, we
know that farms in continuous corn are likely to be practicing cover crops and
conservation as a means to producing more stover. Therefore, for some farmers the costs
of compliance will not change their optimal production outcomes.
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When considering the available management strategies and outcomes for
Biorefinery 2, the set is much smaller than Figure 2-4. Figure 2-7 also shows the tons of
biomass that can be harvested within a 25 mile radius, given the acres by soil type and
management options. These constraints coupled with harvest rates and rotations could
mean that fulfilling the demands of the biorefinery will increase supply costs incurred
through increased transportation costs, as the biorefinery travels further to access more
efficient farms.

Figure 2-7. Supply Options for Representative Plant 2, Within 25 Miles, Limited by
Sustainabilty Constraints
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2.6.1. Environmental Incentives
Regulation has an impact on the structure of the contracts and their pricing scheme.
Those farms that have increased costs due to compliance may not be able to participate in
the biofuels market. Farmers in each rotation will optimize based on these constraints in
order to maximize profit. The first best outcomes from the market or from the contracts
based on type will be distorted. Except for the case of the continuous corn rotation, where
the social outcomes and private outcomes are the same for a majority of acres, regardless
of the constraints on the market (Table 1-15, Table 1-18). However, the uniformity of
policy may be more costly than using differentiated prices to gain economic efficiency
while incentivizing environmental constraint. The biorefinery may decrease the costs of
compliance as a secondary effect to minimizing acreage and increasing the price of
stover. The biorefinery may also choose to create a menu of prices in which the incentive
to use conservation management is included and required.
The nexus of the environmental and moral hazard problem can come from
regions where increasing stover harvested and or decreasing acreage increases the rate of
erosion or the degradation of soil organic matter. The second biorefinery is an example of
how, given current rotations, a biorefinery may choose to increase the rates of harvest in
rotations (corn-corn-soybean) when increasing conservation practices are more costly
than the benefits in stover harvested. In this case, regulation increases the costs for a
larger proportion of the supply shed, decreasing the effects on competition. If regulation
does not exist and prices do not incentivize conservation then the environmental
outcomes for this region may be significant as farmers potentially neglect the
environmental costs to pursue higher profits from harvesting more stover. This may me a
future concern for the biorefineries as the participation of farmers could decreases if
erosion or soil quality losses become apparent.
Within the stover marketplace, one of the fundamental aspects of stover collection
is the tradeoffs that removing stover has with environmental factors, such as erosion,
nutrient replacement and soil moisture management. These are non-marketable services
that the stover provides. Given that we do not know how much a farmer values these
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services as in actuality these are internalized costs to production. We could infer how a
farmer feels about soil erosion by the practices that they employ on their farm. As we’ve
seen in Chapter 1, the variation of outcomes that are possible depending on these
practices represent scenarios of what could happen if the incentives are not geared
towards some kind of conservation, and private costs are low or non-existent.
Incentivizing sustainability while also being concerned with the amounts of stover
harvested creates a conflict for farmers who practice corn-corn-soybean rotations. While
in the case of farmers in corn-soybean rotations, incentivizing the managements leading
to sustainability will improve harvest outcomes. Farmers in continuous corn rotations do
not need any additional incentives as their first best solution is the same regardless of the
sustainability criteria. The adverse selection model will still be required to incentivize
farmers to reveal their rotation type, but the levels of effort for the corn-soybean and
corn-corn-soybean rotations will need to be incentivized, at least for some soil types.
2.6.2. Base Pricing Under Environmental Constraint
Starting with our simple base price option, the biorefineries can again solve for the
optimal price under sustainability. The prices for compliance will undoubtedly increase
the price of stover if no differentiation in type or management is considered. Instead of
focusing on the 15 to 20% of acres that were being unsustainability harvested, this single
priced market requires the entire supply shed to respond uniformly. Table 2-9, shows
that the impact of regulation increases the price for Biorefinery 1, by approximately
$5.18 per ton and decreases the price for Biorefinery 2 by approximately, $2.60 per ton.
The difference in prices is a result of decreased choices in management regimes, an
increase and a shift in the acreage contracted.
The agronomic characteristics at the first biorefinery lend themselves to higher
amounts harvested in the continuous corn acreage and the use of cover crops is almost
required. Though this is not the case for the second biorefinery, as sustainability
constraints are applied the harvestable amount per acre is capped and more acres need to
be contracted. From a planning perspective, this indicates that more land would need to
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be required to meet production goals, more land that could be affected by shocks. The
management strategies for the base contract can be found in Table 2-10.
Table 2-9: Cost and Environmental Metrics Base Contract Under Environmental
Regulation

Cost for Stover (Million $)
Price ($/ton)
Costs for Transportation (Million $)
Total Acres
Tons of Displaced Soil
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

Biorefinery 1
$57.23
100.23
$169.35
157,862
140,706
0%

Biorefinery 2
$49.63
86.93
$24.50
327,842
304,603
0%

Table 2-10: Management for the Base Contract under Sustainability
Biorefinery 1
Total Acres
157,862
Management Regimes (as a % of total acres
Rotation
Continuous Corn
56.43%
Corn- Soybean
29.42%
Corn-Corn Soybean
14.15%
Cover Crops
100rye
99.99%
40rye, 60clover
0.01%
60rye, 40radish
0.00%
NCC
0.00%
Tillage
No-till
85.85%
Reduced till
14.15%
Harvest Rates
High
99.99%
Medium High
0.01%
Medium
0.00%
Vegetative Barrier
No Barrier
100.00%
Some Vegetative Barrier
0.00%
Distance
25 miles
5.94%
50 miles
28.98%
75 miles
65.08%

Biorefinery 2
327,842

18.91%
31.33%
49.77%
29.40%
19.07%
11.21%
40.32%
72.17%
27.83%
26.99%
43.00%
30.01%
49.36%
50.64%
6.79%
28.79%
64.42%
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The key aspect of this shift in management and in acreage has much to do with the
tradeoffs of incentivizing different practices and changing the acreage that is contracted.
From the base contract to the base contract including sustainability, 26% of the same
acreage remained under contract for Biorefinery 1 and 12% for Biorefinery 2.
2.6.3. Incentive Pricing Under Environmental Constraint
If the biorefinery can differentiate the price of stover based on fixed characteristics, then
under sustainability constraints, the cost to the refineries may not need to be as large.
Table 2-11 and Table 2-12, show the differences in prices and acres under incentive
based pricing. For the biorefineries the differences in costs between rotations, indicates
the additional costs of compliance. As expected, continuous corn is a cheaper alternative
to the corn-soybean and corn-corn-soybean rotations. The biorefineries may prefer to
contract solely with continuous corn acres but be limited by land that is in that rotation.
Again, if the assumption of rotation being fixed is relaxed, then the farms would need to
be able to produce at the lower cost including the costs of changing acreage and meeting
sustainability constraints.
Table 2-11: Cost and Environmental Metrics for Rotation Based Incentive Prices Under
Environmental Regulation

Cost for Stover (Million $)
Price ($/ton)
Continuous Corn
Corn- Corn- Soybean
Corn – Soybean
Costs for Transportation (Million $)
Total Acres
Tons of Displaced Soil
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

Biorefinery 1
52.03

Biorefinery 2
49.25

85.90
86.65
106.08
$23.99
265,586
332,815
0%

84.37
88.40
86.39
$24.58
336,359
318,738
0%
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Table 2-12: Cost and Environmental Metrics for Distance Based Incentive Prices Under
Environmental Regulation

Cost for Stover (Million $)
Price ($/ton)
25 miles
50 miles
75 miles
Costs for Transportation (Million $)
Total Acres
Tons of Displaced Soil
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

Biorefinery 1
$81.396

Biorefinery 2
$49.881

87.45
87.40
100.23
$77.34
616,253
342,595
0%

87.00
87.00
88.00
$22.21
245,281
159,324
0%

The cost of compliance still increases the cost of meeting supply goals, but not to the
extent that only changing the base price uniformly affects the bottom line. The refineries
must intensify production on some acreage and still significantly changes which acres are
contracted. Comparing this incentive based pricing scheme with and without
sustainability impacts the price offered by rotation and distance. For the first biorefinery,
under sustainability, the price by rotation decreases for all but the corn-soybean rotation.
In terms of the change in prices for distance from the biorefinery, the difference in price
has to do with the composition of rotations in those regions. Compliance costs may be
higher for acres further from the biorefinery for several reasons, including the correlation
with land and rotation in these areas.
2.6.4. Production Based Pricing Under Environmental Constraint
Production pricing may be the most efficient strategy under sustainability, as the
biorefinery can tailor contracts to cover the costs of different conservation measures
while meeting the goal of least cost supply. Farms may choose to accept these prices
connected to managements if they need additional help in meeting sustainability
constraints. For example, the biorefinery can contract with the most cost-efficient acres as
in the previous sections and require or compensate for additional conservation from only
those acres that would be unsustainable otherwise.
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From the first set of production based pricing, the lowest percentage of acres
unsustainably harvesting stover were 8% for the first refinery and 9% (under incentive
pricing) for the second refinery. Under sustainability, these percentages drop to zero and
the defining criteria will then be by ranking costs of procurement and transportation.
Sustainability may increase either the number of acres under contract or the concentration
of supply from each acre, capped to sustainable limits.

The prices in Table 2-13

represent the costs of compliance and the additional incentives that would be needed to
encourage these practices. As a reminder, farmers would be incentivized to choose these
management practices and then choose the other aspects of the management regimes
independently. Meaning that incentivizing a high harvest rate, would allow for farmers to
choose the remaining conservation practices to best fit their farms.
The penalties on the conservation practices of 100% rye cover and vegetative
barrier indicate several things. From previous analysis we know that farms practicing
100% rye may not need any additional incentives as more stover can be harvested when
this practice is implemented. In addition, the use of cover crops allows these farms to be
sustainable without any additional conservation practices.

Since the farmers are

considered risk neutral, penalties may be used to induce this desirable effort without
additional information needed. Therefore, these benefits may not need to be covered by
the biorefinery and could indicate that the refineries could offer a much lower price per
acre for farms practicing these management strategies, as long as they still met their
participation constraints. Alternatively, the biorefineries could make the farmers
practicing these conservation managements residual claimants, knowing that they will
meet the sustainability criteria at harvest and share the benefits of the additional stover
harvested through an ex ante lump-sum transfer. However, if these farmers are risk
neutral or cannot be punished for not using 100% rye or vegetative barrier strips, then the
biorefinery may choose to implement a limited liability constraint. This type of constraint
forces the biorefinery to only use rewards to incentive the management practice desired.
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Table 2-13: Bonuses by Management Under Sustainability

Tillage
47.791
72.49

Cost for Stover (Million $)
Base Price ($/ton)
Management Bonus ($/ acre)
Reduced Tillage
16.78
No tillage
35.34
High Harvest
Medium High Harvest
Medium Harvest
100% Rye Harvest
40% rye, 60% clover
60% rye, 40% radish
No Vegetative Barrier
Vegetative Barrier
Costs for Transportation (Million $ ) 23.311
Total Acres
260,771
Tons of Displaced Soil
301,448
% of Acres Unsustainably harvested

0%

Biorefinery 1
Removal Cover
58.119
35.977
70.83
71.88

Barrier
39.170
70.93

Tillage
48.619
87.91

Biorefinery 2
Removal
Cover
51.680
48.327
86.90
87.25

Barrier
52.062
87.89

(6.57)
4.49
29.39
110.24
65.79

23.040
247,396
330,739
0%

9.51
0.35
20.01
(87.29)
42.35
98.66

(37.05)
17.20
11.55

68.27
(11.43)
19.282 24.021
205,832 274,132
245,195 333,949

9.32
(11.98)
22.317 23.823
249,069 249,013
308,841 273,431

0%

0%

23.238
254,527
273,851

21.888
260,903
351,944

0%

0%

0%

0%
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2.7. Results and Conclusions
For a Biorefinery to choose to offer these different pricing options, the costs must be
competitive, especially under sustainability constraints. There are several ways in which
a biorefinery can decrease costs of procuring stover. The biorefineries may choose to
offer the most cost effective base, incentive and production pricing options to farmers
through a menu of contracts. Considering both price differentiation and management
requirements farmers may either be indifferent between the outcomes or choose the most
beneficial contract to their current production management regimes. These contracts may
be flexible to include considerations on different supply shocks and sustainability. For the
first refinery, the most cost effective contract may be a production based contract; for the
second an incentive approach may be most effective. Under sustainability constraints a
production based contract may be the most cost effective for both refineries. These
results may change as different assumptions on the composition of farms and whether or
not rotations are fixed.
2.7.1. Discussion of Institutional Factors
Valuing soil through the market is complicated as numerous factors are involved in
adoption, profitability and attitudes towards stewardship, conservation and soil erosion
activities (Chouinard, et al., 2008). At the farm-level, farmers have different perceptions
on the actual costs of erosion; additionally it can take years for erosion to be visible. As
such, the economic decision of the farmer weighs the direct costs of undertaking
conservation measures and replacement costs through increased inputs and increased
equipment costs with the opportunity costs of forgone future productivity through soil
losses (Barbier, 1998, Javurek, et al., 2007, Larson, et al., 2001). However, developing a
market around erosion is not as straightforward; given the nature of non-point source
pollution and that erosion in its simplest terms changes the quality and quantity of land.
These changes can be reflected in land values and growing suitability indices (Duffy,
2012). Therefore, the importance of erosion management is tied to the market for land
and its productivity. Other environmental factors such as water availability, water quality
and soil structure resulting from stover left on the field are also important when
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considering the economic benefits of stover and the relationship to land productivity.
The impacts of stover removal on land quality and as a long-term investment strategy
may dissuade certain soil types from participating in this market or incentivizes farmers
to practice conservation tillage and cover crops, but there are no guarantees. Uncertainties
of what market pressures, climate changes and harvestable amounts will have on soil
moisture, quality and fertility are significant in determining which and where farmers
participate in the corn stover market (Chakir and Parent, 2009).
For landowners, using conservation to improve soil quality can improve the resale
value of the land and rental prices. Farmland with higher soil quality also needs less
inputs and has greater returns on the investment. In rural areas the importance of soil
quality had a higher correlation with land values (Nickerson, et al., 2012). Compounded
into the land market-conservation issue are the differences between owners and operators.
Tenant farmers have been less likely to engage in conservation activities, and nonoperator owners tended to own less valuable land (Soule, et al., 2000). Depending on
rental agreements between these two parties conserving and managing soil resources may
not be well defined, though unlikely. However, rental agreements between owners and
operators and contracts between producers and biorefineries also need to be in line.
Depending on the institutional arrangements between these interested parties, some of the
environmental risks could be managed through alternative conservation practices, like
cover crops and green manure. However, given the cost-competitive aspects, potential
lack of policy-based incentives, and limited numbers of farmers currently practicing these
alternatives, it is debatable what will compel farmers towards increasing conservation
costs, especially as the benefits of conservation are long-term and with the short-term
uncertainties and risks in this market. And these third-party arrangements may further
effect the contracting analysis above by decreasing land available or limiting the
maximum that a farmer could harvest.
One assumption that is worth relaxing when considering the effects of regulation
would be the voluntary nature of these programs and the non-adoption of cover crops and
conservation practices. Although, there are several benefits to cover crops, 11 to 18
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percent of farmers currently use cover crops (Singer, et al., 2007).

This could be

attributed to underestimated costs of using cover crops, especially in regards to the timing
of seeding and killing of the cover. For a more in-depth discussion of the benefits and
costs of using cover crops as an extension of this work see Pratt (2012). Additionally, the
rates of adoption for different conservation methods – tillage and barrier strips - are nonuniform through the landscape. For a more in-depth discussion of adoption and nonadoption of these practices, see Tolvier (2010). The concluding point is that in order for
the usage of cover crops and conservation tillage to be adopted, multiple factors need to
be considered, and farmers need to understand the benefits and be willing to undertake
the costs of these measures in order to participate in the biomass market. In addition, the
profit and incentives for the farmer has to be great enough to spur adoption in a
concentrated feedstock supply shed.
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CHAPTER 3: SUMMARY

As the market for corn stover develops, there are several key environmental tradeoffs that
need to be considered, especially in terms of managing soil resources. In Chapter 1, we
discussed these tradeoffs in the context of farmer decision making at the field level.
Using the most likely management strategies within a five state sample area of the
Midwest, agronomic and economic factors were considered. These agronomic results
were obtained from an integrated RUSLE2/WEPS model, incorporating conservation
tillage, cover crops, barrier strips, rotations and harvest rates. From the integrated model,
the amount harvested per acre, the amount of soil erosion, a metric on the effects to soil
organic matter and management costs were calculated and incorporated into a simple
profit maximization model. The analysis started with the assumption that prices were
fixed at $80 per ton and that the market would exist throughout the sample area, without
regard for competition, current rotations or sustainability.

However, each of these

assumptions was tested throughout the dissertation. The maximization model was then
calculated under different states of nature and decision making parameters for each of the
sample states.
The results of the modeling exercise show how different costs for erosion,
biomass and conservation management will affect outcomes at the farm level under
different scenarios. Sustainability was defined to limit soil erosion from wind and water,
to 5 tons/acre/year and the soil organic matter metric (SCI) to be positive.

These

scenarios covered the outcomes of harvesting stover with and without sustainability.
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Tightening the assumption that the market would freely choose rotations, the 2010-12
crop rotations were used. This approach delineates the optimal outcomes by land within
these rotations, thus reflecting farm level decision making more realistically but
statically. Assuming these rotations are stable, areas that were more or less sustainable in
terms of stover harvest and conservation could be identified.
Chapter 2, moves from the farm level to the market, and considers how prices for
stover and incentives for management practices through contracts could change the
outcomes for different biorefinery locations. This chapter changes the assumptions on
price and competition that were not considered at the farm-level; though the analysis
incorporates the same farmer decision making process and integrated agronomic
modeling as in the first chapter. The integration of farms into a single market place
additionally considered the tradeoffs of the heterogeneous farmers and transportation
costs in how this market would operate efficiently and regionally.
The key assumptions of this chapter were that farmers and biorefineries were risk
neutral, rotations were fixed and that farms were identified by soil type. Aggregation of
soil types was done by 25 mile sections from the refineries in order to decrease the
permutations of possibilities. These simplifying assumptions were made such that the
problem was tractable. The pricing scenarios in this chapter also consider the market
outcomes with and without sustainability constraints. Comparisons or ranking of
incentive structures were done on price, acreage under contract, total costs of
transportation from farm to refinery and on sustainability. In addition, assuming stability
in crop rotations simplified the problem further, creating a lower bound for supply
response. Relaxing this assumption would require not only switching costs between
rotations in technical terms, but also in regards to relative prices. This would link the
price and demand for a regional stover market to corn and all other crops through
changing the bounds for the participation constraint.
The major findings of this research are the explicit tradeoffs of environmental
sustainability in terms of soil quality and quantity and the economics of incentivizing the
harvesting of stover. These tradeoffs, whether positive, negative or neutral are going to
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depend on the locational factors. In some areas and rotations, the potential implications
are positive. Soils that are less prone to erosion may only be limited by the maintenance
of soil organic matter and nutrient replacement. These soil types would not need a change
in management or conservation practices to harvest sustainably. In some areas, adding
the market incentive to harvest stover may dually increase the usage of conservation
management practices, such as cover crops, tillage and barrier strips, decreasing the
overall negative environmental impacts of farming. The costs of these practices would be
offset in the benefits of market opportunities for stover. In areas that are deemed sensitive
to erosion, harvesting stover could impact the environment either positively or
negatively. Without additional conservation, constraints on erosion or soil organic matter,
harvesting stover could be detrimental or vice versa. These regional concerns may be
covered through national regulation and enforcement of sustainability standard,
minimized through price incentives or both. Alternatively, these areas could potentially
be excluded from the market, either at the producer or refinery level, if sustainability is
not accounted for. As these factors are aggregated to the market, the level of demand,
distance traveled and market price will determine how these different impacts are
considered. If there are no sustainability constraints, the price can be lower but only areas
that see economic benefits will practice conservation.
The analysis throughout the dissertation is intended to illuminate different
avenues for thinking about stover harvesting in terms of the environment and regional
farm and market limitations. The tradeoffs are inherently multidimensional and as the
market develops, the aspects of space and density of these regional supply sheds may be
considered. Policy, biorefineries and farmers could use the analysis to consider
alternative avenues for supply chain management, conservation planning or income
generation. In addition, the use of stover as a secondary product for animal feed could use
the same analysis to consider the economic tradeoffs of different harvest levels and soil
impacts.
However, there are limitations to the research herein. Some of the assumptions
considered may not hold in reality when applying these principles to the ‘on the ground

143
truth’. Farms are typically comprised of several different soil types and may or may not
use precision technologies to manage them by soil type, as considered here. Farms may
choose rotation based on macroeconomic factors that were beyond the scope of this paper
and rotations can fluctuate. This may not be a single direction process, as including stover
may incentivize farmers to switch rotations in order to take advantage of the additional
income. Farms also have more options when it comes to conservation and management
that what we considered. Precision agriculture may also be able to customize stover
harvesting to the exact field characteristics and decrease the impact on sustainability. All
of these would have costs or benefits that were not explicitly considered here.
In addition, there is a limitation on the dynamic nature of this problem. The
effects of soil erosion may take decades to fully realize and are highly dependent on soil
level characteristics. Changes in managements, relative crop prices, changes in
technologies, and farmer response may change in a relatively short amount of time. The
estimates from the integrated model are useful when considering the management choice
as stable and as part of a long-term conservation strategy and may not hold under rapid
changes. Especially, if farmers consider soil erosion in terms of thresholds instead of as
marginal changes, little changes in management strategies may not have significant
impacts. Also, these marginal effects on yields may be spread over a long time and
distance when considering the level of stover demanded, the procurement distance
traveled and the intensification of practices. Minimizing these widespread spatial and
temporal effects may further increase the rate at which society and these markets discount
soil resources, at least when considering the aggregate market.
Additional research considering the ecosystem service benefits of stover is
needed. These services include moisture management, thawing in the presence of stover,
and micronutrient replacement. Furthermore, timing aspects with respect to the
harvesting, weather and managing of other farm related activities may limit stover
production. In addition, the aspects of risk through the marketplace and vis-à-vis
environmental decision making may alter the behavior of farmers under different climate
or market conditions. Although there are technologies and practices that can limit these
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risks, the contribution to decreased erosion or improved soil can be economically and
socially motivated. As an example, cover crop adoption may not be widespread for
several reasons. If farmers do not see the economic or social costs of erosion on-site, or
they perceive the costs of cover crops to be high, then farmers are not likely to adopt
cover crops. Tradeoffs to improved soil organic matter on productivity, or how much soil
organic carbon is needed in order to improve soils beyond their current levels is still
widely debated. Without a better understanding of these effects, assessing the economic
decision making process will also be limited. Additionally, the benefits of erosion control
vary depending on the location, soil type, and other numerous factors that change through
the landscape. Therefore, the analysis of factors may not be generalizable, further
complicating the understanding of these complex biological and economic systems.
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If the biorefinery can choose output for the farm, the following becomes relevant,
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